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ABSTRACT
The problem of how the mind relates to the brain stands as one of the greatest challenges today.
The materialistic worldview and pragmatic approach to social problems are both being transformed
by discoveries of how human experience and culture arise in cerebral activity. Even so, this effort,
spearheaded by neuroscience, has seen the important and contentious issue of driver behaviour
somehow been left behind.
From an extensive literature study, it can be concluded that gross disregard of the neural
underpinnings of such behaviour tied to a behaviouristic approach is endemic to the field.
Numerous qualitative psychological models (each associated with debates about their validity) and
Artificial Intelligence models, which effectively only imitate robots 'impaired' to display some
humanlike characteristics, were come across. Although neural networks are derived from current
knowledge of computation within the brain and deployed in industry, human driver behaviour
modelling is not benefiting from this revolution in humanlike information processing.
To date, very little has been done to determine what makes road users speed, drive while drunk,
overtake, or yield at crossroads. As the central nervous system is the human measuring device in
and of the world and thus key affector of human behaviour, it is ofutrnost importance to invest
resources in 'inoculating' the field of driver behaviour modelling onto a robust basis provided by
neuroscience. Being a human driver incorporates a broad complement of interrelated brain systems
to perform driving tasks (psychological functions) at hand, such as lane keeping, speed choice, risk
perception, and obstacle avoidance. The proper level of analysis of such a psychological function
is the level at which that function is represented in the brain. Providing a theoretical model of
human behaviour, based on biological facts of the brain as a whole, is surely a challenge for
decades to come, but the field of driver behaviour should be part of such an effort.
Collaboration is needed among investigators from the fields of neuroscience, psychology,
mathematics, computer science, and engineering to further driver behaviour modelling. It is
uncommon that professionals from these fields have a thorough understanding of the other fields
involved, but the author, not pretending to be an expert, argues that such a union of fields will be of
significant value not only to transportation, but all behavioural sciences. The wealth of to-date
knowledge amassed in neuroscience lies ready to be tapped by researchers interested in explaining
III
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human driver behaviour. To this end, the use of modem brain-imaging techniques will be
invaluable in pinning down the neural correlates of particular driving subtasks, bearing in mind the
extent of structural impacts on the brain of each individual, brought about by a lifetime of
interaction with the environment.
Thus, based on the findings of this literature study, the author proposes that supplementary work be
conducted by a multi-disciplinary team to roll-out an experiment to study the nature of
environmental stimuli as instigators of aggression and road rage, by drawing on knowledge about
brain imaging and (amygdala) activation.
IV
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ABSTRAK
Die vraagstuk hoe die verstand [denke] met die brein in verband staan, is een van die grootste
uitdagings tans. Die materialistiese wêreldbeskouing sowel as die pragmatiese benadering van
maatskaplike probleme word verander deur ontdekkings aangaande die wyse waarop menslike
ervaring en kultuur hul in serebrale aktiwiteit voordoen. Desondanks is in hierdie poging, met die
neurowetenskap aan die spits, die belangrike en omstrede kwessie van bestuurdersgedrag om een of
ander rede agterweë gelaat.
Uit 'n uitgebreide literatuurstudie kan afgelei word dat grootskaalse verontagsaming van die neurale
basis van sodanige gedrag gekoppel aan 'n behavioristiese benadering endemies is aan die gebied.
Talle kwalitatiewe sielkundige modelle en kunsmatige intelligensiemodelle is teëgekom, elk
gepaard met debatte oor die geldigheid daarvan. Hoewel neurale netwerkmodelle gebaseer word
op huidige kennis van verwerking binne die brein en ontplooi word in die industrie, trek menslike
bestuurdersgedragmodellering nie voordeel uit hierdie revolusie in neurale inligtingsverwerking nie.
Tot op hede is baie min gedoen om vas te stel waarom padgebruikers jaag, dronkbestuur,
verbysteek of by kruispaaie toegee. Aangesien die sentrale senuweestelsel die menslike
meettoestel in en van die wêreld is en dus die sleutelbeïnvloeder van menslike gedrag is, is dit van
die uiterste belang om middele te investeer in die fundering van die gebied van
bestuurdersgedragmodellering op 'n stewige basis daargestel deur die neurowetenskappe. Om'n
menslike bestuurder te wees behels 'n omvattende komplement van verbandhoudende breinstelsels
om bestuurstake (sielkundige funksies) te verrig, soos spoedkeuse, risikowaarneming en die
vermyding van obstruksies. Die gepaste ontledingsvlak van so 'n sielkundige funksie is die vlak
waarop daardie funksie in die brein verteenwoordig word. Die daarstelling van 'n teoretiese model
van menslike gedrag, gebaseer op biologiese feite van die brein in die geheel, is gewis nog vir
komende dekades 'n uitdaging, maar die gebied van bestuurdersgedrag moet deel uitmaak van so 'n
pogmg.
Samewerking is nodig tussen navorsers uit die neurowetenskappe, sielkunde, wiskunde,
rekenaarwetenskap en ingenieurswese om bestuurdersgedragmodellering te bevorder. Dit is
ongewoon dat vakkundiges uit hierdie velde 'n deeglike begrip het van die ander gebiede wat
betrokke is, maar die outeur, sonder om voor te gee dat hy 'n deskundige is, betoog dat so 'n
v
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Daarom, gebaseer op die bevindinge van hierdie literatuurstudie, stel die outeur voor dat
addisionele werk gedoen word deur 'n multi-dissiplinêre span ten einde 'n eksperiment uit te voer,
waarin die aard van stimuli uit die omgewing, wat lei tot padwoede, bestudeer kan word, met
inagneming van die beskikbare kennis oor breinskandering en (amygdala) -aktiveringpatrone.
samesnoering van vakgebiede van betekenisvolle waarde sal wees, nie net vir die vervoerwese nie,
maar ook vir al die gedragwetenskappe. Die omvang van die jongste kennis wat in die
neurowetenskappe vergaar is, lê gereed om deur navorsers benut te word wat belang stel in die
verklaring van menslike bestuurdersgedrag. Met dié doel sal die gebruik van moderne
breinskanderingstegnieke van onskatbare waarde wees om die neurale korrelate van bepaalde
bestuursubtake vas te pen, gedagtig aan die omvang van strukturele impakte op die brein van elke
indiwidu teweeggebring deur 'n leeftyd van interaksie met die omgewing.
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"0 LORD our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth!
who has set thy glory above the heavens. When I consider thy
heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which
thou hast ordained; What is man, that thou art mindful of him?
and the son of man, that thou visitest him? For thou hast made
him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with
glory and honour. Thou madest him to have dominion over the
works of thy hands. 0 LORD our Lord, how excellent is thy
name in all the earth! "
"The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and ifby
reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength
labour and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, and we flyaway. So
teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto
wisdom. "
"Search me, 0 God, and know my heart: try me, and know my
thoughts: And see if there be any wicked way in me, and lead me
in the way everlasting. "
"Give instruction to a wise man, and he will be yet wiser: teach
a just man, and he will increase in learning. The fear of the
LORD is the beginning of wisdom: and the knowledge of the
[Holy One] is understanding. "
Psalm 8
Psalm 90
Psalm 139
Proverbs 9
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION - THE ISSUE OF DRIVER BEHAVIOUR
MODELLING
1.1 Human Factors in Modern Traffic Systems - the Need for Modelling
1.1.1 Traffic management and networks
Future transportation systems will integrate many sophisticated technologies. These technologies
will include congestion prediction, dynamic routing, incident detection algorithms, automated
emergency response generation, and real-time adaptive control algorithms to control entrance ramp
access, lane use signals, mainline flow, congestion advisories, and emergency information.
Systems of this complexity may lead to a large number of diverse and complex interactions between
the different components of the system. Computer simulations which couple the traffic control
logic with a lane level traffic model which accurately represents the movements of vehicles through
the network can provide an understanding of these interactions and motivate possible improvements
to the design of the system.
Traffic management systems are dynamic systems which measure traffic conditions and respond to
these measurements by activating lane use signs, variable speed limit signs, variable message signs,
and ramp and mainline meters, and by giving motorists information via highway advisory radio and
other in-vehicle devices. These control actions alter the paths and the behaviour of individual
vehicles en route to their destinations. In tum, the response of the motorists to current control
strategies impacts future control actions that are implemented by the traffic management system.
This feedback or interaction between the control system and the traffic flow system is a key issue of
an evaluation. This requires that the simulation incorporate models for driver response.
Only microscopic simulation models provide the required level of detail and only a model which
provides the capability of modelling the dynamic interaction between the traffic management
system and the traffic flow on the network is appropriate for evaluation of these systems. Many of
the older generation of microscopic models have several drawbacks which limit their use in this
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
evaluation effort. In general, these models were developed for specific networks (freeways or
urban networks) but not for integrated networks. Furthermore, even though more recent versions
do simulate integrated networks, they do not model in sufficient detail driver behaviour, or driver
response to traffic control and information and hence cannot be used for evaluation of certain lane
specific control strategies (for example lane use signal control and mainline control). Moreover,
many of these models generally do not allow en route path diversions but instead determine vehicle
paths exogenously. As a result, reaction of motorists to congestion information and routing
recommendations cannot be easily incorporated.
1.1.2 Human factors and safety
Transportation lies between a social system and a physical system - it goes beyond physics to a
human scale. On the physical side are the striking variety and number of vehicles and road
systems, each contributing its own peculiarities, as well as the weather and other environmental
factors. The social, behavioural side encompasses not only the individual preferences and second-
by-second reactions of drivers but also actions taken by the rest of society. To understand the
forces acting on traffic flow, transportation planners have to analyse the many possible outcomes
from this complex network of decisions (Howard, 1997).
As mentioned above, traffic systems are undergoing enormous change with the advent of Intelligent
Transport Systems (ITS). Although productivity and quality of mobility are emerging interests,
safety remains the predominant preoccupation of ITS human factors. It should be evident that
while intelligent technologies may have the potential to improve traffic safety, they also have the
potential to adversely affect it. Ultimately, the effect on safety depends on the specific
technologies that are invoked and the manner in which they are incorporated within the vehicle as
well as within the larger road transportation system. Current automotive developments can be
characterised as technology-centred solutions rather than user-centred solutions. Greater effort
must be directed at understanding and accommodating the human element in the road transportation
system in order that future transportation objectives can be achieved. There is a need to expand the
scope of traditional human factors to include macro-level effects as well as to place greater
emphasis on understanding human interactions with other elements of the system (Noy, 1997).
Intelligent driver interfaces (IDI) will increase the complexity of the driving task. On the one hand,
new technologies expand the solution space beyond conventional boundaries. On the other hand,
the solution selected must be optimised with respect to usability, suitability, safety and user
2
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acceptance. The increasing complexity of the interface requires that one understands and develops
computational models for complex human-system interactions. Current efforts to generate human
factors design guidelines, principles and data, intense as they are in the USA and Europe, are
important in addressing immediate needs. However, they are inadequate in the medium- to long-
term because they will not yield a coherent body of knowledge of human response and adaptive
behaviour in traffic. Computational models based on sound theory would be far more valuable and
usable by designers (Noy, 1997).
Current IDI trends towards greater automation and greater use of information technologies demand
much greater emphasis on understanding driver cognitive factors than is currently evident. The
proliferation of auxiliary instrumentation (for example, navigation displays) is especially
problematic due to the greater potential for interference between operational-level cognitive
requirements and higher-order, strategic-level cognitive requirements (Kantowitz, 1997). A black
box model of the human driver is no longer adequate to address the emerging needs of system
designers (Thierry et al., 1996). In addition, according to Rasmussen (1990), scientific work in
modern high-tech societies calls for a reconsideration of the notion of human error - research
should be focused on a general understanding of human behaviour and social interaction in
cognitive terms in complex, dynamic environments, not on fragments of behaviour called 'error'.
This approach has similarities to the 'risk homeostasis' theories of traffic safety, with the
reservation that the controlling mechanisms are adaptation in a wider sense than control governed
by criteria related to risk. Designers need models of the human information-processing system that
will predict driver decision-making, situational awareness and strategies for negotiating in traffic.
Such models, supported by much greater computing power, will revolutionise traffic analysis.
3
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1.2 Classical Role-Players in Driver Behaviour Modelling
1.2.1 The engineer and the psyc hologist
Car following is a seductive phenomenon for engineers and physicists. Surely, if drivers are
limited to a single lane, there is a vehicle in front of them and the physical properties of each are
known, then some form of descriptive equation should capture the behaviour observed. Having
presented the case for one pair, surely one can generalise to multiple pairs. Such models should
then aid understanding of one predominant form of traffic accident - the rear-end collision. If such
a model were successful, one would then have a basis for expansion into the less straight-forward
types of manoeuvre like over-taking or turning across traffic. Soon, it would be possible to model
all traffic flow phenomena and significant benefits could be reaped for all of traffic safety.
Although this is a worthwhile and laudable goal, the only problem is reality (Hancock, 1999).
Real world effects have an impact on the model process at several levels. The first concerns the
goal of driving and the goal of car-following models. It is safe to assert, that driving is, with few
exceptions, a satisficing task (Hancock and Scallen, 1999). That is, people drive well enough to
accomplish their task, but by and large they do not seek continual improvement in driving skill
towards some nominal 'optimal' level. In any given situation, they do not seek to optimise their
performance, although some circumstances such as racecar driving represent exceptions. The
problem with a number of existing models is that they frame the question of behaviour around the
idea of optimal performance (Hancock, 1999). Therefore, some models introduce factors such as
'noise' (the use of.Monte Carlo techniques for stimulus- and decision selection) to help explain
performance variation and sub-optimal achievement but they are founded on a flawed assumption.
This often leads to a confused and confusing search for the equivalence between a physical
characterisation such as closing velocity and a psychological phenomenon such as the onset of
avoidance action.
While it is true that the domain of psychophysics has, for over a century, sought relations between
physical intensities and psychological response, it is fair now to question this way of thinking
(Hancock, 1999). People have always considered physics as reality and the psychological response
as a deviation from that reality. However, independent and dependent variables are actually being
mixed up, a mistake that is only now being exposed (Flach, 1999). Thus, deriving equations from
physical descriptions of motion and subsequently trying to fit these to data derived from
behavioural responses, both literally and figuratively, puts the cart before the horse. It is a
4
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historical result of the fact that most early modellers were trained in physics and grounded in
engineering. As a result, the conclusion that such models have proved largely disappointing is not
surprising although it should be noted that this is certainly no necessary reason to dismiss modelling
as a useful strategy.
The reality that the pluralistic motivations of different drivers and the dominance of satisficing
behaviour in driving mean that such models are unlikely to render the' grail' of a simple formula.
Differing contextual factors add layers of complexity to modelling as such factors are introduced
(Ceder and May, 1976). These efforts can rapidly devolve to curve-fitting exercises in which
additional degrees of freedom are added to formulations, as more contextual elements are included.
What such models eventually represent, in driving terms, only their advocates can explain.
Generally, there is no spark of intelligence and no learning; there is only data-driven information
processing - once the parameters for a particular run of the model have been determined the
programme will run strictly on the basis of fixed algorithms and further external inputs. lfthe
outcome of a programme run will be at all surprising, it is simply because of the complexity of the
computation. Some models do not even incorporate real priority interrupts. If a routine which
happens to execute does not contain an instruction which tells it to check for crossing pedestrians, it
will run over any number of them without even noticing (Michon, 1985).
1.2.2 What of psychological models?
Eventually, car-following models were developed which sought to include psychological variables
(Groeger and Brady, 1999). Fundamentally, these models rely upon a perceptual signal to trigger
avoidance behaviour. However, much of the research supporting such threshold notions have
occurred in static, non-reactive, laboratory conditions, not out on the road, demanding actual
decisions and responses. Thus, most so-called 'psychological' models are hybrids, using a single
perceptual parameter as a start signal to 'run' a classic mathematical description. It is also
debatable whether fuzzy-set models, found helpful in crossing the divide between the psychological
and the physical perspective, are an answer or an escape (Hancock, 1999). In the end, some
engineers ask the psychologist how notions such as motivation and attitude can be incorporated into
dynamic models. It is important to understand that putatively more obvious human capacities such
as vision are equally as difficult as driver attitude to fit into equations and that the apparent
simplicity which chronological measures impart is just that, apparent rather than real.
5
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A more important question remains. On what common ground will the physicist and the
psychologist meet? Clearly much remains to be achieved if those of a mathematical persuasion are
to change their fundamental perspective to a psychological focus while many in psychology learn to
use the austere scalpel of numbers in their descriptions of behaviour (Hancock, 1999). Such a
union will be of great value in transportation.
6
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1.3 Objectives, Contributory Value, and Layout ofthe Reported Research
The intention of the author is not to propose a model of driver behaviour, but rather to put forward
an approach in order to extend the knowledgebase on which future driver behaviour experiments
and models can be built. In short, the objectives in reporting the author's research in this
dissertation are to:
a) Give an in-depth account of the state-of-the-art of driver behaviour modelling to understand
better the effect of behaviourism on the current stalemate and lack of new ideas in driver
behaviour modelling since the 1980s.
b) Motivate, through a literature study, the power of rooting observed driver behaviour on
neuroscientific knowledge, to understand better how such behaviour arises from the neural
underpinnings of human brain functioning.
c) Propose ways and means of combining the knowledge from neuroscience, psychology,
computer science, and engineering to lay the platform from which to study and model driver
behaviour holistically in future.
Traffic engineering, as a science, needs to draw on knowledge and insights from other (usually
more basic) sciences to provide the tools needed for work in the field, for example, physics and
mathematics provide the basis for geometric design of roads, and statistics is an important
cornerstone for conducting safety audits of a road network. Traffic engineering differs from the
pure sciences in that it is more concerned with the application of scientific knowledge. It is true,
when seeking solutions to real-world problems, that questions of economy and other considerations
prescribe a need to employ appropriate simplifying assumptions. In order to be useful, such
simplifications must render a problem amenable to efficient solution while retaining the essential
aspects of the postulated situation. These assumptions are based on the current state-of-the-art and
are themselves subject to change as scientific knowledge (in all sciences) is enhanced through
research and additional experience. One should always be attentive to the fundamental
assumptions that are involved in a particular situation and the extent to which these assumptions can
affect the results (Papacostas and Prevedouros, 1993). One such set of assumptions that is in need
of being revisited and extended relates to the human dimension of models in traffic engineering,
specifically the basis from which driver behaviour is understood and modelled. This perspective is
supported by the findings from an extensive literature research outlined in this dissertation.
Before attempting to argue for any changes to the current knowledgebase of driver behaviour
modelling, it is essential to determine the state-of-the-art of the field. Research on drivers and the
7
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driving task covers a broad range of topics and approaches within psychology, the more basic
science furnishing traffic engineers with models of human behaviour. The driving task, as complex
everyday task, provides a focus for a wide range of theories and methodologies, being emphasised
by the breath and the depth of contributions made. In contrast to other fields of psychology, human
factors research in the area of driver behaviour has not been overhauled to the same extent through
the' cognitive revolution', which dethroned the behaviourists, and restored the inner states of mind
as appropriate topics. A related problem in driver behaviour modelling revolves around the fact
that rules which describe externally observable behaviour and rules which determine the functional
relations which generate such behaviour tend to be confused or combined indiscriminately. On the
other hand, psychological (motivational) models, such as the Theory of Risk Homeostasis and
Fuller's risk avoidance model, have been criticised for being qualitative in nature, applicable only to
single-instance situations, and lacking specificity regarding their internal mechanisms, which
precludes validation. These issues, together with comments on the applicability of Artificial
Intelligence models, such as rule-based systems, are discussed in Chapter 2, thereby sketching the
state-of-the-art of the field of driver behaviour in short.
To complement the first part of this study (Chapter 2) and to render a clear and concise line of
reasoning in the main part of this dissertation, uncluttered by excessive detail, a broad literature
review of the extent of knowledge in the field of driver behaviour is presented later on in Appendix
A. This review covers many topics over a wide front in traffic engineering and psychology and
summarises knowledge, opinions, psychological measurements, and models presented in the
literature on this important and complex phenomenon by other researchers. These topics relate to:
a) Culture of driving (such as traffic law enforcement, risk perception, and sensation seeking)
b) Driver training
c) Driver's perception of speed
d) Lane-keeping for straight and curve driving
e) Drivers' visual search
f) Dimensions of aberrant driver behaviour
g) Driver behaviour modelling
h) Drivers' emotions.
Considering the evidence, there is a lack of worthwhile ideas in driver behaviour modelling. A
central shortcoming in most endeavours to enhance the understanding of driver behaviour seems to
be rooted in the inability to base such behaviour as arising from the neural underpinnings of human
brain functioning. Like in the past, failing to do so in future will repeatedly lead to numerous
8
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incompatible and qualitative models unfit for implementation in computer simulations, or else yield
robot-like models, each tied to a debate about its validity. This point of view is elaborated upon in
Chapter 3. The impasse in driver behaviour modelling is not due to a lack of knowledge on brain
functioning and development. An ever-growing body of anatomical, physiological, and
developmental facts, supported by neurally-inspired quantitative models of the brain as a key
affector of an individual's behaviour, is available in the family of neurosciences. This wealth of
knowledge amassed in neuroscience lies ready to be tapped by researchers interested in explaining
human driver behaviour.
It is uncommon for professionals in traffic engineering (or physics), psychology, and mathematics
to have a thorough understanding of neuroscience. Again, to limit the level of detail in Chapter 3,
the purpose of the literature included in Appendix B is to provide such readers with an easy way to
become to some extent acquainted with the current state of selected theory and findings in
neuroscience, and a means for the interested reader to pursue particular topics in greater depth.
The reported literature study is by no means exhaustive in terms of the diversity or level of detail of
topics. As it is important to realise that research on driver behaviour really necessitates studying
the central nervous system as a whole, work on unifying the modularity of brain activity, such as
the approach by Grossberg (2000), produces valuable insights. Other topics relating to
neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, discussed in Appendix B, include neuron activity, brain
development and plasticity, perception, memory systems and learning mechanisms, motor control,
and brain-imaging techniques. In addition, findings from studies relating to the neural
underpinnings of social cognition and emotions are reviewed. These latter issues, together with
attention and consciousness, are inseparably part of a comprehensive driver model.
Sufficient quantitative information exists about the structure of certain brain areas, and the flow of
information to and from them, to build neural network models which have structural as well as
neuronal plausibility. These and other connectionist models, derived from current knowledge of
computation within the brain and designed to mimic human behaviour, as summarised in Chapter 3,
are discussed in more detail in Appendix C. These theoretical models allow researchers to obtain a
clearer view of how parts of a system contribute to the performance of the brain as a whole.
As a direct outcome of the thoroughness of the literature study, summarised in the first part of this
dissertation, the author is in a position to propose an experimental set-up in Chapter 4, which can be
put to work in the quest of finding the environmental stimuli serving as aggression (and road rage)
instigators. As is the case with the in-depth proposal for the extension of the knowledge base of
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driver behaviour modelling, this hypothesis of the utility of brain imaging and (amygdala)
activation in solving the pressing question mentioned, is also new to the field of traffic engineering.
However, one cannot argue away the multi-disciplinary nature, substantial financial layout, and
specialised knowledge needed from inter alia neuroscience, computer science, and psychology to
eventually roll out such an experiment.
In Chapter 5 suggestions are outlined based on the finding that driver behaviour modelling be
'inoculated' onto a robust foundation provided by neuroscience. Studying driver behaviour based
on inputs from psychology, as it has been the case thus far, but incorporating know-how from
neuroscience in future, presents a useful application of knowledge from the two mentioned fields to
enhance driver behaviour modelling. This translates into a direct contribution to traffic engineering
and impacts indirectly on psychology and neuroscience as improved understanding of driver
behaviour renders better understanding of human behaviour in general.
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CHAPTER2
STATE-OF-THE-ART OF DRIVER BEHAVIOUR MODELLING
2.1 Contributions of Psychology in Studying the Behaviour of Drivers
2.1.1 Overview
Research on drivers and the driving task covers a remarkably broad range of topics and approaches
within psychology. The driving task, as complex everyday task, provides a focus for a wide range
of theories and methodologies and allows these to be tested and elaborated in a highly relevant
applied setting. While the research has often been carried out to address practical concerns, the
fact that a single everyday task has elicited this involvement across the discipline of psychology
stands in marked contrast to the fractionation and demarcation which is evident in much current
psychology. This point is easily made by looking at the various groupings psychologists have
organised themselves into within the many psychological societies and organisations. However, as
mentioned below, research on driving is also important to psychology, being emphasised by the
breath and the depth of contributions made (Groeger and Rothengatter, 1998).
2.1.2 Driver's perception and cognition
Through studying driving, research within the memory tradition, such as that by Chapman and
Groeger (1998) on memory for risk related and emotionally arousing driving events or that by
Maycock, Lester and Lockwood (1996), which strongly indicates a 'forgetting factor' in
retrospectively reported traffic accidents, offers important insights into what is now described as
episodic memory (Groeger, 1997). These, together with the studies by Gugerty (1997) and Perrig
and Kintsch (1985) on way-finding and thus spatial memory, and the massive proceduralisation of
elements of the driving task, and thus involvement of procedural memory make clear the scope for
significant contributions to both mainstream memory research and driver behaviour.
Attention, as a crucial aspect of cognition, has also been widely studied within the driving literature,
through research on attention switching and workload (Verwey and Veltman, 1996), and the
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dependence on some general attentional or intellectual resources (Duncan, 1993). In describing
aspects of attention, almost every author in mainstream psychology uses driving as a paradigm case
of automaticity, although closer analysis of even the least complex aspects of the driving task, such
as gear changing, does not conform to many of the assumptions made (Groeger and Rothengatter,
1998).
2.1.3 Developmental approache s
Within developmental or life span approaches to psychology, transportation is also represented.
Some of this work relates to evaluating the effectiveness of various traffic safety education
programmes. Furthermore, a number of studies have linked early behavioural difficulties and
personality characteristics with the adoption of unsafe driving practices in later adolescence (Caspi
et aI., 1997; Moffitt et aI., 1996). At the other end of the age spectrum the considerable difficulties
encountered by elderly drivers using the traffic system include those suffering from dementia and
other age associated disabilities and have been the focus of increasing attention (Poser, 1993).
2.1.4 Social psychology of drivi ng
A considerable amount of research in social psychology has also focused on driving and drivers.
This work includes, for example, the link between attitudes and behaviour, extensions of Ajzen's
(1991) theory of planned behaviour and the role of driver affect and emotion in violations of road
traffic conventions (Lawton et aI., 1997). A range of other work, explores the various social
cognitive biases which operate on drivers assessments of themselves, other drivers, the situations
they find themselves in, and the risks they confront. These biases include, for example, attribution
bias, false consensus bias, unrealistic optimism and the illusion of control (Greening and Chandler,
1997).
2.1.5 Driver state
Issues relating to stress, fatigue and arousal have been themes in psychological studies of driving
and transport operation for a considerable amount oftime. Studies in this area tend to be motivated
by practical rather than theoretical concerns, but the research nevertheless makes a considerable
contribution to the human factors literature, from near visionary in-car information handling
systems envisaged in the GIDS project (Michon, 1993) back to the very early selection studies for
drivers of commercial vehicles.
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2.1.6 Individual differences
Much research has considered the extent to which personality and life style factors contribute to
accident causation. The focus on personality factors has been enduring, and reflects the historical
developments in more mainstream work on the topic. Recent research by Arthur and Graziano
(1996), applies the now dominant five-factor model of personality to accident involvement, and
finds that those lacking in Conscientiousness are at greater risk. The work of Mercer and Wayne
(1995) demonstrates convincing relationships between actual personality characteristics, violations
of traffic and other laws and recidivism, and thus opens up die possibility of early identification of
those more likely to be involved in accidents.
2.1.7 Applications
From the early days of driver testing, traffic psychology has not just provided a theoretical basis for
understanding road user behaviour but also has contributed to the development of accident
countermeasures. While this development is still largely focused on measures aimed to improve
road users' skills, cognitions and attitudes, impact on vehicle and road design is on the increase,
which is in part a result of the introduction of road transport informatics now commonl y known as
Intelligent Transport Systems. Driver error, intentional or unintentional, has been identified as a
major contributory factor in the accident process, and novice road users - be they pedestrians,
cyclists or drivers - appear to be disproportionally at risk. Education and training have therefore
been the focus of attention.
2.1.8 Education
Early studies demonstrated the relevance of the development in capabilities such as speed and
distance perception (Vinjé, 1981) for specifying educational objectives, for example, young
children's road crossing skills. Teaching programmes which make use of principles borrowed
from behaviour modification (such as prompting, feedback and incentives) proved very effective in
installing safe road crossing behaviour and were used as basis for developing programmes which
relied on parental training (Limbourg and Gerber, 1981). Such approaches also could be applied
through mass media messages (Rothengatter, 1984) and do lead to demonstrable reduction in child
accidents when implemented by television channels (Preusser and Blomberg, 1987). However,
implementation in the educational system appears much more problematic.
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2.1.9 Driver training
While driver training should provide the basis for safe and efficient traffic participation, there are
many studies indicating that it is not (Brown et al, 1987) which is due to many factors, many of
these of a practical nature which determine that psychological principles of which is known that
these affect the effectiveness of training are not taken into account. Systematic feedback and error
correction procedures, for example, are not systematically applied. It has been argued that driver
training should be structured in accord with cognitive psychological concepts such that drivers learn
appropriate production rules, but this has as yet not been applied to driver training practice (Michon
et al., 1990).
2.1.10 Public information campa igns
Despite their obvious popularity among practitioners, there is very little evidence that public
information campaigns are effective. It has been argued that such campaigns are mostly ineffective
because they address drivers' level of perceived risk rather than drivers' level of acceptable (target)
risk (Wilde, 1982, 1994). Following this line of reasoning, public information campaigns should
alter drivers' subjective utilities of desired and undesired behaviour. Experiments using incentives
to reward desired behaviour have demonstrated that this is indeed an effective approach, in
particular in relation to seat belt usage (Geller, 1990). It is certain, however, that the potential
safety benefits of such approaches have not as yet been explored in full.
2.1.11 Traffic law enforcement
The alternative to providing incentives for desired behaviour is providing disincentives or
punishment for undesired, risky behaviour. The latter is the basic premise of traffic law
enforcement, which has been studied extensively, albeit mostly in evaluation studies that did not
analyse psychological principles for the effects found. Results from studies emphasise the
importance of (subjective) probability of detection and the need to optimise this through combining
enforcement strategies with public information campaigns. The reviews also clearly demonstrate
that systematic and consistent application of principles derived from general behaviour-
modification literature can result in significant changes in driver behaviour, most notably in speed
choice and drinking driving. Much less is known about enforcement of less obvious but equally
risky behaviour such 'give way' violations, aggressive driving, and antisocial driving behaviour. A
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major issue is also the attitude-behaviour relation, and in particular the question whether attitude
change precedes, or is the result of, behaviour change. Application of automated enforcement
techniques, which allows in principle a perfect objective detection rate as in speed and red-light
cameras, has raised the issue of societal acceptance of, and individual reactance to, such
enforcement techniques.
2.1.12 Driver improvement and rehabilitation
While detecting drivers who deviate from normative, desired behaviour may become increasingly
effective, it remains the question what measures should be taken once the offending driver is
detected. There is every indication that relatively small fines are hardly a deterrent, in particular
for professional drivers who have substantial economic motives for violating traffic law. With
respect to rehabilitating those with problem behaviours, the work reported by Utzelmann and
Jacobshagen (1997) on the rehabilitation of German drivers with alcohol problems, is an important
large-scale validation of the outcome of psychotherapeutic interventions.
2.1.13 Road and vehicle design
The understanding of how drivers perceive their road environment and how they process the
information obtained from the environment is a key to the design of the environment. The fact that
most accidents are due to driver error emphasises rather than refutes the argument that road design
that is adapted to drivers' capabilities and limitations enhances safety. This approach has been
termed 'self-explaining roads', 'designing for safety', or 'sustained safety design' and many studies
have been carried out indicating how this can be achieved (Van Elslande and Alberton, 1997).
Providing engineers with design principles which take account of drivers' capabilities, and
individual as well as momentary differences in these capabilities, may be one of the most
challenging tasks for traffic psychology.
2.1.14 Final remarks
This brief overview of the issues, theoretical approaches and methodologies which are current in the
psychological literature on driving reveals both the richness and breath of the involvement of
psychology in driving research. It may seem as if no single approach or theoretical stance is ever
likely to be sufficient to account for behaviour in traffic, due to the complexity of the human
behaviour been set as the goal of understanding (Groeger and Rothengatter, 1998).
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2.2 Driver Models to Date - Avoiding Explanatory Pitfalls
2.2.1 Overview
Models describing observed driver behaviour, and which can be implemented in a traffic simulation
procedure, can refer to either of two levels of explanation, (i) the rational or intentional level that is
usually taken to represent the aggregate behaviour of the driver population, or (ii) the functional
level which deals with intra-individual information processing. Frequently the two levels are
confounded, which is likely to introduce serious theoretical problems - vicious circles and
pernicious homunculi among them. Good driver models should move of and by themselves; they
should be generative - the principal characteristic of a scientifically acceptable driver model is its
propensity to generate comparatively complex behaviour from comparatively few and simple
principles (Michon, 1989).
According to Michon, a possible approach to get a discussion of driver models under way would
seem to categorise them according to what makes them move. A whole spectrum of possibilities
exists. On the one hand there are traffic safety models which resemble 'Dinky Toys'. They move
by magic or, what amounts to the same thing, by pushing them around by hand. In traffic research
there are still many such models, although eventually they will be recognised for the clever curve
fitting tricks they are. At the other extreme ofthe spectrum will be models which move
autonomously and learn from their experiences. Such models are able to cope with their
environment in a reasonable way (Michon, 1989).
Reasonable (or rational) is also the term used to qualify the performance of another class of model
which reacts to external inputs while 'keeping its goals in mind'. Such models single-mindedly
aim at maintaining the value of specific output variable levels without undergoing any change of
their structure, as in the case of a room thermostat, for example. Models representing this kind of
feedback system do not adapt their internal structure on the basis of their experiences, and it would
seem farfetched to ascribe rationality to such systems and to the models which represent them
(Michon, 1989). Models which are driven by concepts and adaptive rules and that are
consequently able to learn belong to a class which can ultimately be said to move about in a rational
fashion and keep their goals in mind. Only such models will tend to perform increasingly better
and have any scientific survival value at all. Ultimately, the question remains as to whether such
models are based on and advance the understanding and knowledge of the behaviour of human
drivers.
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2.2.2 Magic of curve-fitting
In 1949 Smeed formulated his famous formula, relating the number of fatalities on the road (D), the
number of motorised vehicles (M) in a particular geographical region, and its population (P). The
formula, D = c(MP2J'/3 did describe this relation over a period of many years and for many parts of
the world (Smeed, 1949, 1968, 1972; Adams, 1985). There is, however, a serious problem with
Smeed's law - no one has really succeeded in offering a plausible explanation in terms of the social
psychological processes that give rise to this empirical relation. It seems an interesting coincidence
that Smeed's law is formally identical to Kepler's second law, which relates the mean distance (D)
ofa planet from the Sun, to its period (P), D = c(P2)1!3. However, while Smeed's law does little
else than describe the data it was derived from in the first place, Kepler's law follows directly and
necessarily from Newton's law of gravitation (Michon, 1989).
Empirically, Smeed's law suddenly and drastically broke down around 1973 in countries all over
the world. Thus, the formula, unlike Kepler's law evidently became what it had been in the first
place - a magical toy and a clever piece of curve fitting. Despite this dramatic failure of Smeed's
conjecture, there are still authors who remain faithful to it. Adams (1985), for example, claims that
'the law is still holding up remarkably well.' Unfortunately Adams is wrong, for the simple reason
that in passing this judgment he has not considered data from recent years (Michon, 1989).
Smeed's rule should be put to rest unless - or until - researchers succeed in explaining the rule in
terms of its underlying mechanisms. Like other' laws' - such as Kepler's second law - Smeed's
law cannot and should not survive, unless its form can be deduced from the properties of the traffic
system's functional architecture.
2.2.3 Risk homeostasis
The concept of the well-known Theory of Risk Homeostasis (RHT) proposed by Wilde (1982a) is
deceptively simple - accident occurrence at the aggregate level is taken to be a regulatory process
by means of which the level of risk in a society is kept constant. This risk is expressed in some
measure of disutility or unsafety, for example, the number of fatalities. When circumstances
change in such way that the objective risk of driving decreases, for instance, when the level of road
maintenance improves, the behaviour of the driving population will shift towards more risky forms
of behaviour. As a result the number of fatalities will remain the same, despite the improvement.
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While Smeed's interpreters have failed altogether to define what processes can give rise to Smeed's
law, the Theory of Risk Homeostasis has come up with just one distinct but highly overtaxed
principle (note - a principle, not a process). Because at the intra-individual level homeostasis is so
pervasive that it will account for almost every form of activity, it is too weak a principle to impose
the right kind of constraints on behaviour. In short, ensembles of homeostats do not necessarily
produce homeostatic behaviour. Non-homeostatic processes may easily generate homeostatic
behaviour at the aggregate level, for example, it can be shown that risk homeostasis may be an
outcome, under certain conditions, of a process of trip utility maximisation (Michon, 1989). In
addition, motivational models have been criticised for lacking specificity regarding their internal
mechanisms, which precludes validation (Michon, 1985; Molen and Botticher, 1988).
2.2.4 Prearranged structures
Another issue to be raised is in some sense the complement of the preceding ones. It concerns the
fact that many traffic safety models which deal with individual behaviour mimic the structural
elements of a task environment, rather than explain how these task elements are brought about by
underlying processing mechanisms. They mimic reality in the sense that they already contain
everything that is there - including everything that is there to be explained. As an example,
consider a model that has been proposed by Van der Molen and Botticher (1988, also Botticher and
Van der Molen, 1988). The aim of these authors is to develop a genuine process theory of the
driver. They use descriptive terms that are consistent with the analysis of driving in terms of a
three-tiered division into strategic (planning), tactical (manoeuvring), and operational (skill) aspects
of the driving task (Michon, 1971).
However, the approach adopted by Van der Molen and Botticher reflects, in the opinion of Michon
(1989), a common type of conceptual error resulting from confounding the rational level and the
functional (process) level. It is analogous to the (erroneous) assumption that every step in a
cookbook recipe must correspond to a specific feature of the finished dish. It reflects, in other
words, confusion between a grammar and the sentences that can be generated with it.
One important aspect to be highlighted is Van der Molen and Bëtticher's attempt to specify
processing units at each ofthe three levels of the driving task - planning, manoeuvring and skill.
As an elementary form oftask analysis this distinction has served as a convenient way of
partitioning the field of driver behaviour research in manageable sub-domains. The point that Van
der Molen and Botticher seem to have missed, when they set out to implement these three levels in
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their process model, is that distinctions which are useful to describe what appears to be going on in
driving, when adopting the intentional point of view, not at all correspond with relevant distinctions
which need to be made at the functional level. Or, to combine the culinary and the linguistic
metaphor of the preceding paragraph - the syntax of the kitchen does not necessarily match the
semantics of the dining room (Michon, 1989).
2.2.5 Rational versus functiona I explanation
The preceding examples touch directly upon the important issue of confounding two levels of
explanation in driver modelling, two levels that ought to be kept apart but which are frequently
mixed in actual practice. One is called the intentional level, and the other the functional level.
In making this distinction with respect to driver models, the first point to observe is that aggregate
behavioural models, such as Minter's (1987) learning curve explanation of Smeed's law or Wilde's
risk homeostasis model do not really describe collective behaviour (Michon, 1989). Almost
invariably they are treated as descriptions of central tendencies of the behaviour of an idealised (but
ultimately individual) driver. Such 'prototypical' descriptions, based on the average behaviour of a
whole population, a random sample, or perhaps specific segments of the population, rest heavily on
the assumption that the average driver will, as a rule, behave rationally (or reasonably, intelligently,
meaningfully, or whatever term may be chosen).
In contrast, genuinely individual driver models usually seem to be formulated at the functional
(design) level of theoretical discourse. At this level behaviour is described in terms of (mental)
functions and processes, operations performed on internally represented facts about the world.
However, instead of assuming that the driver is behaving optimally (or rationally), the focus of
attention in this type of model is on actual behaviour. And since actual behaviour is usually sub-
optimal, the model is designed to function sub-optimally too, so as to faithfully mimic the driver's
performance.
Theorists are constantly facing the risk of confounding these two levels of discourse, the rational
level and the functional level. Terrible things may happen when they mix, which they frequently
do (Michon, 1989). One of these catastrophes is the introduction of pernicious homunculi or, what
almost amounts to the same thing, vicious circles, in one's theory. As an illustration, take Freud's
psychoanalytic theory of the human person as a dynamic relation between three sub-personal
components, the ego, the super-ego and the id. Everything would have been fine, had not these
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three components been attributed precisely the kind of properties (for example, intelligence and
motivation) they are supposed to explain. The consequence will be clear - nothing is gained in the
end. Ultimately Freud explained a conscious agent - the person - by postulating three
(unconscious) agents (or homunculi) which were given the same sort of features the conscious agent
already possessed in the first place.
Since they confound the intentional and functional levels of explanation, Minter's learning curve
explanation of Smeed's law falls into the trap of vicious circularity, the Theory of Risk Homeostasis
seems to be infested with pernicious homunculi, and Van der Molen and Botticher have eliminated
the generative power of their sub-personal model. In order to explain the shape of a curve
describing decreasing casualty rates, an increase in experience is assumed on the basis of the same
curve it is supposed to explain. In order to explain risk homeostasis as a societal phenomenon, an
individual propensity towards risk homeostasis is assumed in the first place. And in order to make
the behaviour of a driver appear to be governed by information processing at three levels, his/her
cognitive apparatus is supplied with components that reflect these levels (Michon, 1989).
2.2.6 Stimulus-response models
It is clear that the problem how to connect behaviour at the aggregate level (as tackled by the
attribution of rationality, intelligence, and so forth) with the sub-personal functional level centres
around the proper separation of concepts and terms that belong to, and operate at, either level. It is,
in other words, necessary to specify clearly and concisely what are elementary processes and
building bricks at the functional level, and what are the complex (aggregate) behaviours that are
generated by these elementary processes (Michon, 1989). This consideration partially underlies the
concept of rule-based behaviour (Fuller, 1984, 1988). Fuller's model is based on the' syntax' of
instrumental conditioning. As such it deals, at the functional level, with the strength of association
between stimuli and responses and with the corresponding transition probabilities between
successive elements in a chain of external (or internal) actions. In Fuller's model these associative
mechanisms lead eventually to actions for avoiding harmful or uncertain situations.
The model is also distinctly intentional. This is due to the fact that the behaviour which is
generated by the internal workings of the rules of association and shaped by reinforcement and
punishment, can be perceived as rational- it is maximising some form of subjective utility.
Fuller's model does (implicitly) separate its assumptions about functional mechanisms (for
example, association and reinforcement) from its assumptions about the intentional, adaptive
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aspects of behaviour. Approach and avoidance are rational in the context of the prevailing
circumstances rather than in the context of the principles of association, and Fuller's model is
consistent with this position (Michon, 1989).
According to Michon there is, however, one serious flaw in the type of model Fuller proposes. As
soon as one wishes to extend it to situations which are slightly more complex than the one-shot
threat-avoidance reaction to a stimulus in an otherwise static situation, one runs into significant
difficulties. Technically speaking, the syntax of approach-avoidance models is that of the Markov
process and Markov processes cannot account for the generativity of human behaviour.
2.2.7 Rule-based models
Based on the preceding discussion Michon (1989) favours rule-based or production-based models.
However, there appears to be considerable opposition to rule-based models. The ultimate reason
seems to be a belief that the rule-based model falls into precisely the trap discussed above - mixing
two levels of explanation, the intentional level and the functional level. On that assumption one
can understand, for example, Janssen's (1986) verdict that production-based models of the kind
Michon proposed earlier (Michon, 1985) are trivial, or at best nontrivial only because the designer
of the model has put in all nontrivial knowledge by hand. In a sense this is the same objection
made earlier with regard to the model proposed by Van der Molen and Botticher (1988). However,
according to Michon (1989), Janssen's argument is based on a misunderstanding about the nature of
the rules at the intentional or action level and their internal representation at the functional or
procedural level. In other words rules which capture behaviour at the intentional level (that is,
rules which can be interpreted as rational) need not correspond with rules at the functional level, but
rules which determine the processes at the functional level should suffice to generate the kind of
behaviour which one can call rational and that, in turn, can be described by rules at the intentional
level.
How can adequate structural and functional constraints on a rule-based model be imposed, without
being accused of triviality or of putting the model's intelligence in by hand? Certainly not by an a
priori choice of formal constraints which are too narrow (as in the case of Fuller's threat-avoidance
model). Perhaps by finding a structure which is semantically plausible; a structure which offers a
context in which one can attribute a meaning to the behaviour the model is supposed to exhibit.
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According to Michon (1989) such a structure is Soar, an intelligent architecture developed by Allen
Newell (Laird et aI., 1987). Soar is the formalisation of a theory of human problem solving, put
forward by Newell and Simon (1972) and amounts to searching a problem space by applying
operators to successive states of the problem. Many activities can be described in these terms.
Newell (1989) even takes a more radical position by claiming that any intelligent behaviour can in
principle be described as a form of problem-solving behaviour. This seems the ultimate
extrapolation of the claim (Michon, 1976) that all travel behaviour (which includes driving) may be
described as problem solving. This implies that Soar, because it is an exemplary problem-solving
system, may be considered as a natural medium for modelling driver behaviour.
In Soar, the rules which one can write down and which seem trivial to the critics of rule-based
modelling, are patterns of interconnected elements in the working memory of the system.
Knowledge represented in this format is indeed trivial in the sense that it is presented to the system
from the outside in a ready-made form. In short, the following will happen in Soar as a model of
the cognitive activity of the human driver. Given an overriding top goal, for example, travel from
point A to point B, and some knowledge about the facts of life, Soar will begin searching its
working memory. It will search for a pattern of interrelated knowledge elements which has the
structural characteristics of a problem space which it can search and which is, moreover, connected
with the stated top goal. (One might choose to call such a pattern a scenario). If anything that
answers this description is found, Soar will immediately select it. Itmay, of course, find nothing
that meets the structural requirements of a problem space for the stated top goal. However, Soar
may also find more than one pattern, since it will always test the whole content of its working
memory in a parallel fashion. In both cases, when it finds no matching pattern or when it finds
several such patterns, Soar will find itself in an impasse, which it will recognise as a new problem
to be solved. Consequently it will specify a new goal, subordinate to the original top goal, and
Soar will select as its next task to solve that particular impasse.
A feature of the internal operation of Soar is its learning mechanism, called chunking. If Soar
works its way through a series of one or more impasses and finally reaches a solution which allows
it to resume its primary activity - that of attaining its top level goal - it will proceed only after
building a new rule which will tell it what to do when it would ever hit upon the same impasse
again. Itwill add this rule to its rule-base and subsequently wipe its slate, that is, it will forget all
the irrelevant trial and error it went through before it found the proper solution.
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2.2.8 Fatal shortcomings ofrul e-based models
However, the author is of the opinion that Michon's preference of utilising a rule-based system
(such as Soar) to model driver behaviour is flawed for a couple of reasons, apart from the findings
of others (for example, Janssen, 1986). The first concerns the viewpoint that human behaviour can
be viewed as a form of problem-solving behaviour. It is believed that thinking does not normally
involve the pure reasoned rules of logic. This has been demonstrated in research by Johnson-Laird
(1988). He found that quite often people draw logically invalid conclusions, suggesting that if the
human mind is a formal logic machine, it is a poor one. People are rational, according to Johnson-
Laird, but they just don't achieve their rationality by following formal laws of logic. However,
Frank (1988) argues that decision-making is often not rational at all in that many actions, purposely
taken with full knowledge of their consequences, are irrational. If people did not perform them,
they would be better off and they know it.
Furthermore, at the functional (design) level of Michon's proposed rule-based system the (mental)
functions and processes are embodied in terms of rules representing facts about the world. In
addition, when hitting upon impasses, the rather inadequate robot-like learning (or chunking)
mechanism operates by building new rules based on existing ones, most of which were initially
presented as knowledge to the system from the outside in a ready-made form. Inadvertently some
required intelligence is inserted into the model by hand. Thus, it is clear that such a limited rule-
based system cannot assist traffic engineers and psychologists in their quest to significantly advance
the understanding and mimicking of humanlike rationality and learning, not to mention other crucial
and untouched domains of human cognition (for example, perception, attention, forgetting, and
error proneness), emotions, and motor control impacting on driver behaviour.
2.2.9 Conclusions
Rules which describe externally observable behaviour and rules which determine the functional
relations which generate such behaviour tend to be confused or combined indiscriminately in
various contemporary models. Using a rule which describes observable behaviour as a shorthand
expression for internal information processing brings with it the risk of infesting one's processing
model with pernicious homunculi or vicious circles - technically speaking one is putting the
explanandum in the explanans (Michon, 1989). Rule-based systems, such as Soar, may seem to
conform to a central principle of making a clear distinction between these two types of rules, thus
somehow reducing the risk that one is inadvertently inserting the required intelligence into the
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model by hand. However, such systems fall short of even explaining humanlike rational reasoning
and learning, and, without touching on issues of stimulus processing, attention, memory retrieval,
emotions, and motor control, should be dismissed.
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CHAPTER3
TOWARDS AN EXTENDED BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND
MODELLING DRIVER BEHAVIOUR
3.1 Robot-like or Human Behaviour
Michon (1985) proposed to head for an intelligent, knowledge and rule-based model of the driver
capable of dealing with a wide variety of realistic, complex situations, or, as he stated, a
psychologically plausible expert system. By choosing a rule-based architecture, as proposed, it
would seem as if an architecture suited for the development of an intelligent robot has to be
thwarted in order to exhibit humanlike behaviour. This can be another pitfall similar to the
functionalistic modelling principle discussed previously of making a clear distinction between rules
which describe externally observable behaviour and rules which determine the functional relations
which generate such behaviour. Specifically, it is essential to discriminate between wishing to
design a robot-like controller required to negotiate a road network, shared with or without human
drivers, in a safe and optimised (and perhaps a humanlike) manner; or, on the other hand, the quest
of better understanding the interacting and underlying mechanisms shaping the behaviour of an
individual driver as part of human behaviour in general. Like in the case of general science, it
follows that the level of detailed knowledge of only the latter will determine, for example, the
strength and rate of success of driver education and training programmes to foster proper road sense
or to manipulate and alter different aberrant behaviours of individual drivers. In addition, such an
understanding will assist engineers and psychologists in explaining and modelling what humans
actually do while exposed to various traffic environments as opposed to what humans are capable of
doing.
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3.2 Applying Models of Cognition
According to Michon (1985), there appeared to be a lack of new ideas in driver behaviour
modelling in the 1980s, as it seems to be also the case today (2002). In his paper, Michon had to
answer the double question: 'What do we know, and what should we do?' An analysis led him to
the conclusion that human factors research in the area of driver behaviour has hardly been touched
by the 'cognitive revolution' which swept psychology in the fifteen years prior to 1985, dethroning
the behaviourists and restoring the inner states of mind as appropriate topics. Throughout much of
the first half of the twentieth century, psychology was dominated by behaviourists, who believed
that the subjective inner states of mind, like perceptions, memories and emotions, are not
appropriate topics for psychology (Skinner, 1938).
However, more than a decade after Michon's paper, traffic researchers seemingly have embarked
upon investigating the application of architectures integrating cognitive and perceptual-motor
processes in models of task and attention management (for example, Salvucci et aI., 2001). The
field to study rationality, known as cognitive science, tries to understand how people come to know
their world and use their knowledge to live in it. It asks how people recognise a certain pattern of
visual stimulation falling on the retina as a particular object, sayan apple, or determine the apple's
colour, or judge which of two apples is bigger. It seems that humans are different from other
animals very largely due to the far greater richness of humans' cognitive processes. Associated
with memory of individual events and sophisticated generalisations, these processes allow subtle
analogies and explanations - and the ability to draw pictures and speak and write. Cognitive
science is often described as the 'new science of mind' (Gardner, 1987), however, it is a science of
only apart of the mind, the part having to do with thinking, reasoning, and intellect, as emotions are
not been taken into account.
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3.3 Functionalism and Current Models of Cognition
Functionalism is the idea enshrined in the old proverb - handsome is as handsome does. Matter
matters only because of what matter can do. Functionalism in this broadest sense is so ubiquitous
in science that it is tantamount to a reigning presumption of all of science. And since, in science,
there has always been searched for simplifications, looking for the greatest generality which can be
mustered, functionalism in practice has a bias in favour of minimalism, of stating that less matters
than one might have thought. For example, the law of gravity states that it does not matter what
material an object consists of - only its mass matters (and its density, except in a vacuum). The
trajectory of cannonballs of equal mass and density is not affected by whether they are made of
iron, copper or gold. Itmight have mattered, one imagines, but in fact it does not. And wings do
not have to be covered with feathers in order to power flight, and eyes do not have to be blue or
brown in order to see. Every eye has many more properties than are needed for sight, and it is
science's job to find the maximally general, maximally non-committal- hence minimal -
characterisation of whatever power or capacity is under consideration. Not surprisingly, then,
many of the disputes in science concern the issue of whether or not one school of thought has
reached too far in its quest for generality (Dennett, 2001).
Since the earliest days of cognitive science, there has been a particularly bold kind of functionalistic
minimalism in contention, the idea that just as a heart is basically a pump, and could in principle be
made of anything so long as it did the requisite pumping without damaging the blood, so a mind is
fundamentally a control system, implemented in fact by the organic brain, but anything else which
could compute the same control functions would serve as well. The actual make-up of the brain -
for example, the chemistry of synapses, and the role of calcium in the depolarisation of nerve fibres
- is roughly as irrelevant as the chemical composition of the cannonballs mentioned earlier.
According to this tempting proposal, even the underlying micro-architecture of the connections
within the brain can be ignored for many purposes, at least for the time being, since it has been
proven by computer scientists that any function that can be computed by one specific computational
architecture can also be computed (perhaps much less efficiently) by another architecture. If all
that matters is the computation, one can ignore the wiring diagram of the brain, and its chemistry,
and just be concerned about the 'software' running on it (Dennett, 2001).
This bold vision, computational ism or 'strong AI' (Searle, 1980), is composed of two parts: the
broad creed of functionalism - handsome is as handsome does - and a specific set of minimalist
empirical wagers: neuroanatomy doesn't matter; chemistry doesn't matter. This second theme
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excused many would-be cognitive scientists from educating themselves in these fields, for the same
reason that economists are excused from knowing anything about the metallurgy of coinage, or the
chemistry of the ink and paper used in bills of sale. This has been a good idea in many ways, but
for fairly obvious reasons it has not been a politically astute ideology, since it has threatened to
relegate those scientists who devote their lives to functional neuroanatomy and neurochemistry, for
instance, to relatively minor roles as electricians and plumbers in the grand project of explaining
human behaviour. However, the recent history of neuroscience can be seen as a series of triumphs
for the advocates of detail. Yes, the specific geometry of the connectivity matters; yes, the location
of specific neuromodulators and their effects matter; yes, the architecture matters; yes, the fine
temporal rhythms of the spiking patterns matter, and so forth. Many of the fond hopes of
opportunistic minimalists have been dashed: they had hoped they could leave out various things,
and they have learned that no, if one leaves out x, or y, or z, one cannot explain how the mind
actually works (Dennett, 2001).
This has left the mistaken impression in some quarters that the underlying idea of functionalism has
been flawed. On the contrary, the reasons for accepting these new claims are precisely the reasons
of functionalism. Neurochemistry matters because - and only because - it has been discovered that
the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers which diffuse through the brain
have functional roles bringing about important differences. What those molecules do, turns out to
be important to the computational roles played by the neurons, so one has to pay attention to them
after all (Dennett, 2001).
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3.4 Towards a Neural Basis for Models of Cognition
Hebb (1949) put forward the case for basing models of cognitive functions on what is known about
the physiology of the brain, enabling the anatomist, physiologist and neurologist to contribute to
psychological theory. Hebb thought that it would help psychological theorising if there is an input
from neurophysiology. However, some researchers maintain that neurophysiological plausibility is
irrelevant to psychological theorising and that the gap between knowledge of what brain structure is
and how it produces behaviour is so wide that any endeavour to make psychological theories
neuronally plausible is at best unhelpful, and at worst positively misleading (McLeod et al., 1998).
Furthermore, Churchland and Sejnowski (1990), reacting to the functionalism that the mind can be
modelled independent of knowledge of how the brain works, have argued that nature is more
ingenious than humans are. Humanity stands to miss all that power and ingenuity unless
neurobiological plausibility is attended to. The point is, it has already been done in nature, so why
not learn how that stupendous machine, the human brain, actually works? It should be clear that
opposition against vigorously incorporating up-to-date advances in the neurosciences will
constantly hamper valuable progress on a wide front in the behavioural sciences.
Fortunately, in the last decade or so there has been an ongoing revolution in the understanding of
how the human brain, primarily involved in cognitive behaviour, given streams of input from a
structured world by its sensory receptors, can perform functions and learn novel facts in a
humanlike manner by means of a system which computes with simple neuron-like elements, acting
in parallel (McLeod et aI., 1998). The investigation of what can be achieved by models which
perform parallel distributed processing is called connectionism.
Despite the complexity of the behaviour they can simulate, the principles on which connectionist
models are based are simple. These are derived from observations of the organisation of
information processing in the brain:
a) The basic computational operation in the brain involves one neuron passing information
related to the sum of the signals reaching it to other neurons.
b) Learning changes the strength of the connections between neurons and thus the influence
that one has on another.
c) Cognitive processes involve the basic computation being performed in parallel by large
numbers of neurons.
d) Information, whether about an incoming signal or representing the memory of the network
of past events, is distributed across many neurons and many connections. There is no one
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place where a particular piece of knowledge can be located. All the knowledge that the
network contains is superimposed on the same set of connections. All the processing that
the network can do is determined by the same set of connections.
Since the central principles of connectionist models are derived from current knowledge of
computation within the brain, the models are said to be 'neurally inspired'. This puts them in stark
contrast to traditional models in cognitive psychology or artificial intelligence (AI). Traditional
models in cognitive psychology contain elements like limited capacity channels, articulatory loops
and short-term memory stores. Models in AI contain sets of rules. Either approach allows
modelling of human cognitive capacities, but in general no attempt is made to relate the operations
these elements perform to the way the brain works at a neuronal level. The aim of a traditional
model is to describe the performance of the subject, not the way that the performance is achieved.
The connectionist approach is the reverse. It starts with a model which incorporates brain-like
processing and sees whether behaviour emerges, which mimics that shown by people (McLeod et
al., 1998).
Since the brain does compute with neurons it might seem to go without saying that neural
plausibility is a virtue in modelling cognitive processes. Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks to
this approach. Researchers do not have a complete understanding of the way that information is
transmitted between neurons in the brain. The method of passing information from neuron to
neuron in connectionist models certainly occurs, at least at a conceptual level. However, in the
brain there are other methods of inter-neuronal signalling which are not yet implemented in
connectionist models. Also, some connectionist models contain procedures, especially learning
algorithms, which are at present believed not to occur in the brain. But, the important point is that
completely accurate neural models may be possible in the future. At the moment neural
plausibility is a relative rather than an absolute virtue. Contemporary connectionist models are
based on the assumption that although they make simplifications, they can provide a useful starting
point for understanding how cognitive computations might be performed.
In most connectionist models the overall structure has not been related to any particular brain area.
Nevertheless, sufficient quantitative information exists about the structure of certain brain areas,
and the flow of information to and from them, to build neural network models which have structural
as well as neuronal plausibility. Examples include a model of episodic memory formation which
has a structure based on the hippocampal system, and a model of visual object recognition which is
based on the organisation of information processing in one of the visual pathways in the primate
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brain. These models involve brain-like learning mechanisms of pattern association,
autoassociation, and competitive learning. It is important to note that, through these modelling
studies, major progress is being made in understanding how the hippocampus works as part of the
brain's system for memory formation. An implementabie quantitative model like this allows more
than just showing that a particular approach to implementing brain function works. It allows one to
see how performance changes as various aspects of the simulation are changed. Thus, a clearer
view of how parts of the system contribute to the performance of the whole can be obtained
(McLeod et al., 1998).
Fundamental to the classical view of cognition is the existence of discrete symbolic entities,
representing possible states of the world. On this view cognitive activity involves the manipulation
of these symbols by rules. The interaction of symbols and rules to produce thought can be seen as
similar to the interaction between words and syntax which produces language. The problem with
connectionism, on this view, is that distributed representations of propositions lack the internal
structure necessary to permit rule-governed transformations. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that
this counts decisively against connectionist approaches to cognition - aspects of mental processes
which they referred to as their systematicity and compositionality. However, networks with
recurrent connections can form basins of attraction so that inputs within a given range will
eventually settle on an identical output. Different attractor basins capture different sets of inputs.
To the extent that attractor basins are insensitive to small variations in input, they could be
considered to have a symbolic quality. Rule-governed behaviour might be the trajectory through a
series of attractor basins which a network passes through in performing a task such as processing a
sentence.
One argument against the connectionist approach is not to deny that cognition is carried out by
neural networks in the brain, but to say that studying them is pointless. The networks merely
implement rules and symbols in a somewhat opaque way. If one is interested in rule and symbols
one should study them directly. A possible counter to this is that although one can study the rules
and symbols directly one will never discover anything more than what they are. The connectionist
approach may possibly show why they are as they are. For example, a minority default rule could
be learnt in a language with one distribution of words and not in a language with a different one.
At the level of rules this would just be a fact; at the level of a connectionist model one can see why.
The relative merits of the traditional and connectionist approaches to cognition are affected by what
different people see as a plausible scientific theory of the mind.
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Another insight, which stems from connectionist modelling, concerns the separation of the 'what'
and 'where' channels, as observed in the primate visual system. One can reasonably ask how the
brain networks got to be that way. One answer has been to propose that organisms come equipped
with a range of expert networks that possess specialised computational capacities. Tasks are co-
opted by the specialist networks depending on the suitability of their computational properties for
the task at hand. Jacobs et al. (1991) have shown how mixtures of expert networks exposed to a
'what/where' problem will always assign the 'where' task to the expert network which possesses a
linear activation function. The implication is that networks do not necessarily need to be designed
to carry out particular tasks. Rather, the task will select the network which has the appropriate (or
innate) computational properties.
In addition, connectionist modelling of past tense acquisition by children shows that inferring
dissociations in mechanism from dissociations in behaviour (in this case, performance on regular
versus irregular verbs) is hazardous. It is not necessary to invoke a separate symbolic system to
explain the processing of regular verbs. For example, the model by Plunkett and Marchman
(1993) demonstrates how patterns of regularity and irregularity might be represented in a cognitive
system without appealing to an innate pre-wiring of the system. The model challenges the
orthodoxy that learning a language consists of learning a system of symbolic rules. Of prime
importance to developmentalists is the demonstration that a homogenous computational system can
learn to perform a complex task which was thought to require a heterogeneous architecture. The
model demonstrates that one does not need as much pre-wired, innate structure to learn the past
tense as the dual-route approach in psychology supposes (McLeod et aI., 1998).
The fact that a multi-layered network can perform the task does not prove that children use the same
type of mechanism - only that they might. Evaluation of the plausibility of the model rests on its
behavioural predictions. Connectionist models are slaves to their training environments. Their
performance reflects the distribution of examples they encounter. For example, current
connectionist models predict that the onset of over-regularisation errors, heralding the discovery of
the regularities underlying the inflectional system, is closely yoked to the achievement of a critical
mass of regular verbs in the child's vocabulary. A critical mass effect in children acquiring the
English past tense has been demonstrated by Plunkett and Marchman (1996). Connectionist
modelling of development provides the researcher with a tool for examining the trade-off between
initial architectural and computational constraints on the one hand and environmental information
on the other.
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An appealing aspect of the connectionist approach is that the models of cognitive processes are
computational. That is, they actually produce a response to a stimulus. The predictions that such
models make about reaction time or error rate or interference can be compared at a quantitative
level to the behaviour produced by subjects in experiments. The inability of many traditional
models of cognitive processes to do more than make qualitative predictions about the effect of some
experimental variable on performance has often made it difficult to choose between them because
they make the same qualitative prediction. Connectionist models have given a precise match to
data obtained in experiments with human subjects. Connectionist simulations do not just mimic
results which are already known. Their predictions have suggested fruitful areas for
experimentalists to investigate (McLeod et aI., 1998). Therefore, to mimic human behaviour it
would be advantageous to base modelling on a system architecture relating operations such as
stimulus processing, learning, memory retrieval, and motor control to the way the brain functions at
neuronal level. Thereby it can be ensured that the 'required' and 'appropriate' intelligence and
learning mechanisms are built into the model.
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3.5 Importance of Emotion and Consciousness alongside Cognition in Modelling
According to psychologists, stress results when the perceived demands of the driving task are
appraised as exceeding the driver's ability to cope with them. There are marked individual
differences in self-reported susceptibility to stress during driving. General driver stress is
associated with higher levels of neuroticism, aggression-hostility, emotional reactions to overtaking
and being overtaken, frequency of everyday hassles, self-rated poor concentration and
absentmindedness, and with stressed mood. Furthermore, involvement in automobile accidents is
correlated with an insufficiency in the ability to control changes in emotion, emotional lability and
excessive dependence on environmental stimuli.
Interestingly, McEwen (1992) has shown that severe but temporary stress can result in a shrivelling
up of dendrites in the hippocampus of an animal. Dendrites are the parts of neurons which receive
incoming inputs and which are responsible, in large part, for the initial phases of long-term
potentiation and memory formation (Koch et al., 1992). McEwen has also shown that if the stress
is discontinued, these changes are reversible. However, with prolonged stress, irreversible changes
take place. Cells in the hippocampus actually begin to degenerate. When this happens. the
memory loss is permanent. Recent studies have specifically shown that the human hippocampus is
vulnerable to stress (Bremner et al, 1995).
Another key issue in applied social psychology research deals with the effectiveness of fear-
arousing messages for changing attitudes and behaviours. A persuasive message presenting a
person with the possibility that he/she is at risk with regard to the occurrence of an aversive event is
effective in changing his/her behaviour. The fear aroused by a threatening message leads the
person to mentally and behaviourally rehearse recommended actions to avoid the danger and thus
reduce the fear. Threat appeals have been used for many years as the main mean to foster careful
driving-related attitudes and behaviours. These appeals usually consist of road-trauma films,
showing crashed cars, bereaved parents, or injured people who were involved in car accidents. The
goal of these appeals is to elicit fear and to remind people of their own vulnerability and finitude
while driving in a reckless manner. However, there are opposing views on the effectiveness of
driving-related threat appeals.
In short, driving has become intolerably stressful, dangerous, and demeaning. Drivers are stressed,
threaten each other, are in a bad mood, terrorise their passengers, and often fantasise violent acts
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against each other. Emotions are as much traffic and transportation issues as cognitive functions,
road conditions and traffic flow are in a comprehensive transportation model.
Understanding emotions in the human brain is clearly an important quest, as most mental disorders
are emotional disorders. Emotions are biological functions of the nervous system which is in itself
an enormously rich source of variables to manipulate. Figuring out how emotions are represented
in the brain, greatly expand opportunities for making new discoveries beyond what can be achieved
with psychological experimentation alone, and can help people understand them. This approach
contrasts sharply with the more typical one in which emotions are studied as psychological states,
independent of the underlying brain mechanisms. Psychological research has been extremely
valuable, but an approach where emotions are studied as brain functions is far more powerful.
Additionally, studying the way emotion (and cognition) works in the brain can help to choose
between alternative psychological hypotheses - there are many possible solutions to the question of
how emotions (and cognitions) might work, but the only relevant one (in understanding human
behaviour) is the solution which was put into the brain with creation (LeDoux, 1998).
Therefore, according to LeDoux, the proper level of analysis of a psychological function is the level
at which that function is represented in the brain. This leads to a conclusion that the word
'emotion' does not refer to something that the mind or brain really has or does. 'Emotion' is only a
label, a convenient way of talking about aspects of the brain and the mind. Psychology often
carves the mind up into functional pieces, such as perception, memory and emotion. These are
useful for organising information into general areas of research but do not refer to real functions.
The brain, for example, does not have a system dedicated to perception. The word 'perception'
describes in a general way what goes on in a number of specific neural systems - humans see, hear
and smell the world with their visual, auditory and olfactory systems. In a similar vein, the various
classes of emotions are mediated by separate neural systems. There is no such thing as the
'emotion' faculty and there is no single brain system dedicated to this function.
Ongoing research is rapidly advancing understanding about how the brain detects and responds to
emotionally arousing stimuli, how emotional learning occurs and emotional memories are formed,
and how conscious emotional feelings emerge from unconscious processes. When these neural
systems function in a human with conscious awareness, then conscious emotional feelings occur.
Emotional responses, for example, trembling, sweating, and heart palpitations are, for the most part,
generated unconsciously.
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Conscious feelings, like the feeling of being afraid, or angry, or happy, or disgusted, are in one
sense no different from other states of consciousness, such as the awareness that a roundish, reddish
object is an apple, that a sentence just heard was spoken in a particular foreign language, or that one
has just solved a previously insoluble problem in mathematics. States of consciousness occur when
the system responsible for awareness becomes privy to the activity occurring in unconscious
processing systems. What differs between the state of being afraid and the state of perceiving red
is not the system which represents the conscious content (fear or redness) but the systems that
provide the inputs to the system of awareness. There is but one mechanism of consciousness and it
can be occupied by mundane facts or highly charged emotions. Emotions easily bump mundane
events out of awareness, but non-emotional events (like thoughts) do not so easily displace
emotions from consciousness.
Emotions are things which happen to people rather than things people will to occur. Although
people set up situations to modulate their emotions all the time (for example, going to movies and
amusement parks, or consuming alcohol and other recreational drugs), in these situations, external
events are simply arranged so that the stimuli which automatically trigger emotions will be present.
People have little direct control over their emotional reactions. While conscious control over
emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness, because the wiring of the brain is such that
connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than vice versa.
Once emotions occur they become powerful motivators of future behaviours, setting the course of
both moment-to-moment action as well as towards long-term achievements. Emotions can have
both useful and pathological consequences. When fear becomes anxiety, desire gives way to greed,
or annoyance turns to anger, anger to hatred, friendship to envy, or pleasure to addiction, emotions
start working against people.
The study of emotion has been ignored by the field of cognitive science, the major scientific
enterprise currently concerned with the nature of the mind. As cognitive scientists treat minds as
information-processing devices, they have traditionally been more interested in how people and
machines solve logical problems than in why people are sometimes emotional. This shortcoming
has been corrected in an unfortunate way - by redefining emotions as cold cognitive processes,
stripping them of their passionate qualities. At the same time though, cognitive science has been
very successful and has provided a framework that, when appropriately applied, provides an
immensely valuable approach for pursuing the emotional as well as the cognitive mind. One of the
major conclusions about cognition and emotion, which comes from this approach, is that both seem
to operate unconsciously, with only the outcome of cognitive or emotional processing entering
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consciousness and only in some instances. Just as one can study how the brain processes
information unconsciously in perceiving visual stimuli and using visual information to guide
behaviour, one can study how the brain processes the emotional significance of stimuli
unconsciously and uses this information to control behaviours appropriate to the emotional meaning
of the stimuli.
Cognitive scientists tend to think of the mind in terms of the functional organisation of unconscious
processes which underlie and give rise to mental events, rather than conscious contents which occur
during and as a result of the processing (Neisser, 1976). These processes span many levels of
mental complexity, from the routine analysis of the physical features of stimuli by sensory systems,
to remembrance of past events, to speaking grammatically, to imagining things which are not
present, to decision-making and beyond. As Lashley (1950) pointed out, conscious content comes
from processing, and humans are never consciously aware of the processing itself but only of the
outcome. Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978) were engaged in studies of split-brain patients which led
them to similar conclusions. It can be concluded that people normally do all sorts of things for
reasons they are not consciously aware of (because the behaviour is produced by brain systems that
operate unconsciously) and that one of the main functions of consciousness is to keep people's lives
tied together into a coherent story, a self-concept. It does this by generating explanations of
behaviour on the basis of self-image, memories of the past, expectations of the future, the present
social situation and the physical environment in which the behaviour is produced (Gazzaniga,
1988).
It seems clear that much of mental life occurs outside of conscious awareness. People can have
introspective access to the outcome of processing (in the form of conscious content), but not all
processing gives rise to conscious content. Stimulus processing which does not reach awareness,
in the form of conscious content, can nevertheless be stored implicitly or unconsciously and have
important influences on thought and behaviour at some later time (Bowers and Meichenbaim, 1984;
Bargh, 1992). Furthermore, information can be simultaneously processed separately by systems
that do and do not give rise to conscious content, leading to the conscious representation in some
and the unconscious representation in other systems. That much of the processing involved in
these functions occurs unconsciously has allowed cognitive science a luxury that earlier forms of
mentalism did not have - the field could get on with the business of studying the mind without
having to first solve the problem of consciousness (Churchland, 1984). In fact, it is probably true
that consciousness will only be understood by studying the unconscious processes which make it
possible.
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What is it about emotion that has compelled cognitive scientists to separate it out from attention,
perception, memory and other bona fide cognitive processes? Why was emotion excluded from the
rehabilitation of the mind which took place with the cognitive revolution in psychology? When the
computer metaphor was developed, it was seen as more applicable to logical reasoning processes
than to so-called illogical emotions. However, cognition is not as logical as it was once thought
and emotions are not always so illogical. Success in life, according to Goleman (1995), depends on
a high EQ (emotional quotient) as much or more than a high IQ. It is true that derailed emotions
can lead to irrational and even pathological consequences, but emotions themselves are not
necessarily irrational.
Fortunately, some cognitive scientists have recognised that emotion is important. Simon (1967),
for example, argues that cognitive models need to account for emotions in order to approximate real
minds. These suggestions by leading cognitive scientists have finally begun to have an impact -
more and more cognitive scientists are getting interested in emotions. While early AI programmes
were most successful at modelling logical processes, more recent models have gone far beyond this
truly artificial approach and some try to model aspects of emotions. Some programmes use
emotional 'scripts' or 'schemas' as aids to decision making and action, others try to simulate the
processes through which people evaluate or appraise the emotional meanings of stimuli, and still
others attempt to make use of the understanding of the emotional brain in order to model how
emotions are processed (Dyer, 1987; Scherer, 1993b; Frijda and Swagerman, 1987; Sloman, 1987;
Armony et aI., 1995). The logical/illogical or rational/irrational distinction is not very sharp when
it comes to separating emotion and cognition, and certainly not a clean way of defining what a
science of mind should be about.
The functionalist conception of mind as a programme that can run on any machine (mechanical,
electronic, biological) has been easy to accept, or at least tolerate, in the area of cognition. The
biological machine of relevance to cognition, of course, is the brain. The idea that the brain is a
cognitive computer is now commonplace. However, in emotions, unlike in cognitions, the brain
0-
does not usually function independently of the body. Many if not most emotions involve bodily
responses. No such relation exists between cognitions and actions. In the case of cognitively
driven responses, the response is arbitrarily linked to cognition. This is partly why cognition is so
powerful - cognitions allow people to be flexible, and to choose how they will respond in a certain
situation. If the biological machine of emotion, but not cognition, crucially includes the body, then
the kind of machine that is needed to run emotion is different from the kind needed to run cognition.
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Even if the functionalist argument (that the hardware is irrelevant) could be accepted for mind as
cognition (and it is not clear that it can), it would not seem to work for the emotional aspects of the
mind (since the hardware does seem to make a difference when it comes to emotion).
Programming a computer to be conscious would be an essential first step towards programming it to
have a full-blown emotional experience, since the feelings through which people know their
emotions occur when they become conscious of the unconscious workings of emotional systems in
the brain. However, even if a computer could be programmed to be conscious, it is not guaranteed
that it could be programmed to have an emotion, as a computer does not have the right kind of
composition, which does not come from the clever assembly of human artefacts but a specialised
biological creation. For LeDoux it seems impossible that a full-blooded emotional feeling could
exist without a body attached to the brain which is trying to have the feeling. Bodily feedback
needed entails somatic and visceral information which returns to the brain during an act of
emotional responding.
Emotion and cognition are best thought of as separate but interacting mental functions mediated by
separate but interacting brain systems (LeDoux, 1998):
a) The perceptual (cognitive) representation of an object and the evaluation of the significance
of an object are separately processed by the brain.
b) The emotional meaning of a stimulus can begin to be appraised by the brain before the
perceptual systems have fully processed the stimulus.
c) The brain mechanisms through which memories of the emotional significance of stimuli are
registered, stored and retrieved are different from the mechanisms through which cognitive
memories of the same stimuli are processed.
d) The systems that perform emotional appraisals are directly connected with systems involved
in the control of emotional responses. Once an appraisal is made by these systems,
responses occur automatically. In contrast, systems involved in cognitive processing are
not so tightly coupled with response control systems. The hallmark of cognitive processing
is flexibility of responses on the basis of processing. Cognition gives people choices.
e) The linkage of appraisal mechanisms with response control systems means that when the
appraisal mechanism detects a significant event, the programming and often the execution of
a set of appropriate responses will occur. The net result is that bodily sensations often
accompany appraisals and when they do they are a part of the conscious experience of
emotions. Because cognitive processing is not linked up with responses in this obligatory
way, intense bodily sensations are less likely to occur in association with mere thoughts.
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An emotion is not merely a collection of thoughts about situations. It is not simply reasoning and
cannot be understood by just asking people what went on in their minds when they had an emotion.
Emotions are notoriously difficult to verbalise since they operate in a neural space which is not
readily accessed from consciousness. Psychiatrists' and psychologists' offices are kept packed for
this reason. Still, much of the understanding of the way the emotional mind works has been based
on studies which have used verbal stimuli as the gateway to emotions or verbal reports to measure
emotions. In contrast to consciousness and its associate, natural language, unconscious processing
is the rule rather than the exception throughout the creation. Moreover, in the unconscious mental
realm nonverbal processing is the standard. Given that so much work on unconscious processing
(cognitive and emotional) has focused on verbal processes, the picture of the level of sophistication
of unconscious processes in humans is probably highly inaccurate. The workings of human
unconscious processes will only be fully understood once the use of verbal stimuli and verbal
reports is phased out (LeDoux, 1998).
LeDoux's idea about the nature of conscious emotional experiences and feelings constitutes that a
subjective emotional experience, like the feeling of being afraid, results when one becomes
consciously aware that an emotion system of the brain, like the defence system, is active.
Emotional experience is not a problem about emotion. Instead it is a problem about how conscious
experiences occur. Emotions researchers certainly have a lot to contribute to the study of
consciousness, but figuring out consciousness is not their job, or at least theirs alone. Although this
may seem obvious, the study of emotion has been so focused on the problem of emotional
consciousness that the basic underlying emotional mechanisms have often been given short shrift.
By treating emotions as unconscious processes which can sometimes give rise to conscious content,
the burden of the mind-body problem is lifted from the shoulders of emotion researchers and allow
them to continue with the problem of figuring out the unconscious emotional functioning of the
brain. In order to understand what an emotion is and how particular emotional feelings come about
one needs to understand the way the specialised emotion systems operate and determine how their
activity gets represented in the system which gives rise to consciousness.
Conscious emotional feelings and conscious thoughts are in some sense very similar. Both involve
the symbolic representation in consciousness of sub-symbolic processes carried out by systems
which function unconsciously. However, the difference between them is not due to the system
concerned with consciousness. Emotional feelings and mere thoughts are generated by different
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sub-symbolic systems, while emotional feelings involve many more brain systems than thoughts
(cognition).
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3.6 Brain Development - the Role of Neurobiochemical Processes and Environmental
Influences
According to Squire and Kandel (2000) people are not who they are simply because they think.
People are who they are because they can remember what they have thought about. Understanding
the ways in which early experiences influence how people remember, how they make connections
to others, the ways in which they feel and create internal models of the world, and the manner in
which they learn to organise their sense of self each should be understood from a common,
synthetic view. Siegel (1999) explores the ways in people connect with others and themselves
through their relationships, emotions, and the stories of their lives and puts forward a way of seeing
one's life and relationships with others from a perspective that shows how one's mind is created
from a combination of brain processes ('neurobiology') and one's relationships with other people
(' interpersonal').
The principles of how stimuli and genes act together to control brain differentiation are beginning to
come to light. When embryo nerve cells migrate and form into patterned aggregates, and when
they grow long, branching axons which sort themselves in an intricate criss-crossing array to make
up patterned circuits, they communicate by biochemical expressions of regulator genes, switching
the actions of other genes governing nerve cell development. Once the network of nerve
connections is formed, another factor, conduction of nerve impulses, adds power and precision to
this communication. The phenomenon whereby the neighbourhood relationships of cells in one set
are maintained in the connection pattern formed with the other set, is common within the nervous
system. It is known that many of the functions of the nervous system depend on the existence of
these orderly mappings. The brain is seen to lay the foundations of even the higher psychological
processes before birth. The way the human brain parts grow before birth suggests that the
interacting nerve cells might make up and coordinate basic rules for object perception, purposeful
movement patterns, and for motive states, mostly without the benefit of experience. This is
confirmed by the behaviour of infants shortly after they are born.
One is therefore obliged to pay careful attention to the steps by which nerve cells are linked up into
communicating systems, as brain growth is inseparable from mental growth. It is important to note
that the facts of brain growth do not imply that mental and physical abilities governed by the brain
simply expand and elaborate independently of stimuli, nor do they give the brain a passive
submissiveness to experience (Gregory, 1987). Furthermore, studies emphasise the capacity
(which remains even into adulthood) for reorganising the structure and function of cortical maps
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(even the organisation of action) as the result of injury or of particular kinds of experience. The
effects of experience on the brain can be viewed as a continued elaboration of the developmental
programme.
It is now clear that the anatomy and function of human cerebral cortices are very variable. People
differ in the pattern of their mental abilities because their brains grow in different forms. Some of
this diversity of human minds will be pre-programmed in a great variety of outcomes of gene
expression in nerve tissue development, but the same brain processes are also influenced by foetal
and postnatal environments. In future research, brain science will be concerned with breaking
through the veil of ignorance which still conceals how developments in human brain tissue over the
years of childhood relate to psychological maturation. In this phenomenon, unique in
developmental biology, the state of morphogenetic regulators in an immature organism depends
upon the affections and interests of more mature conscious beings, and upon the way the brains of
these beings from the preceding generation have been programmed with cultural rituals and beliefs
in an earlier childhood. Growing human brains require cultivation by intimate communication with
older human brains. Thus are built the powerful collaborations of human society (Gregory, 1987).
To summarise, infants are born with a number of primitive tendencies and sensory limitations
which constrain the possible developmental paths that can be taken by powerful perceptual and
cognitive learning systems. Further, because only parts of the adult cognitive system are in place
during early infancy, and certain brain pathways and structures are slower than others to develop,
the study of infants offers one a unique opportunity to unravel how complex hierarchical and
parallel competing brain pathways give rise to adult cognition. The study of infancy is thus central
to significant further progress in the neurosciences (Johnson, 1994). In the same vein, Schore
(1999) argues for the rapprochement between neurobiology and psychoanalysis, to bring together
neurobiology, developmental neurochemistry, behavioural neurology, evolutionary biology,
developmental psychology, developmental psychoanalysis and infant psychiatry. Schore's central
thesis is that 'the early social environment, mediated by the primary caregiver, directly influences
the evolution of structures in the brain responsible for the future socio-emotional development of
the child'. It is of vital importance to keep all these aspects of brain development in mind when
one, for example, sets out to understand and model the behaviour of a learner driver, or the changes
in behaviour over the lifetime of a driver. For example, just consider how long the neural circuitry
of an individual's brain will have been exposed to the shaping effects of the environment by the
time he/she applies for a learner permit at, for say, the age of sixteen.
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There is no denying that genes make humans different from one another and explain at least part of
the variability in the way different people act in situations. However, one has to be very careful in
interpreting differences in behaviour between different people. Dawkins (1982) states that if a
person is homozygous for a gene G, nothing save mutation can prevent passing G on to all his/her
children. So much is inexorable, but whether or not the person, or his/her children, show the
phenotypic effect normally associated with possession of G may depend very much on how they are
brought up, what diet or education they experience and what other genes they happen to possess.
People's separation into haves and have-nots, weak and strong, and other such categories is more
often than not a product of cultural evolution, a process far more complex than the mere mutation
and adaptation. According to Ehrlich (2000) genes 'do not shout commands to us about our
behaviour; at the very most, they whisper suggestions' .
It can be concluded that genes give the raw materials out of which to put together brain functioning.
They specify the kind of nervous system humans will have, the kinds of mental processes in which
it can engage and the kinds of bodily functions it can control. However, the exact way humans act,
think and feel in a particular situation is determined by many other factors and is not predestined in
genes (Bateson and Martin, 2000). There exists a mistaken notion that science has discovered
individual genes which determine certain personality traits. For example, some, if not many,
emotions do have a biological basis, but social, which is to say cognitive, factors are also crucially
important. Nature and nurture are partners in humans' emotional (and cognitive) life, and the
difficulty is to figure what their unique contributions are.
What does it really mean to say that a behaviour is innate? Elman et al. (1996) describe a
framework in which interactions, occurring at different levels, give rise to emergent forms and
behaviours. These outcomes may often be highly constrained and universal, yet are not themselves
directly contained in genes in any domain-specific way. They propose a taxonomy of ways in
which a behaviour can be innate, including constraints at the levels of representation, architecture,
and timing. Typically, behaviours arise through the interaction of constraints at several of these
levels. These ideas have been explored through dynamic models inspired by a new kind of
'developmental connectionism,' a union of connectionist models and developmental neurobiology,
forming a new theoretical framework for the study of behavioural development. While relying
heavily on the conceptual and computational tools provided by connectionism, Elman et al. (1996)
also identify ways in which these tools need to be enriched by closer attention to biology.
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3.7 Social Cognition and the Human Brain
A 'Theory of Mind' (TOM) is a specific cognitive ability to understand other persons, and therefore
other drivers, as intentional agents, that is, to interpret their minds in terms of theoretical concepts
and intentional states such as beliefs and desires. It has been commonplace in philosophy to see
this ability as intrinsically dependent upon linguistic abilities. After all, language provides people a
representational medium for meaning and intentionality - thanks to language a person is able to
describe other people's and his/her own actions in an intentional manner. According to this view,
the intentionality of natural language, that is, the suitability for expressing meanings and thoughts,
is the key for understanding the intentionality of a person's theory of mind.
However, a major challenge to this view came from studies on primate cognition and comparative
psychology. Premack and Woodruff (1978) argued that experimental evidence of chimpanzees'
understanding of human behaviour could be interpreted as detection of intentions. Although other
primatologists have challenged their experimental data, there is growing evidence showing that
non-human primates have some intentional understanding of their social world (Tomasello and
Call, 1997). The presence of such capacity in non-human (and thus non-linguistic) species leads to
the conclusion that it is possible to investigate TOM as a biological endowment independently of
language.
Humans are exceedingly social beings, but the neural underpinnings of social cognition and
behaviour are not well understood. Studies in humans and other primates have pointed to several
structures which playa key role in guiding social behaviours. These structures appear to mediate
between perceptual representations of socially relevant stimuli, such as the sight of conspecifics,
and retrieval of knowledge (or elicitation of behaviours) which such stimuli can trigger. Current
debates concern the extent to which social cognition draws upon processing specialised for social
information, and the relative contributions made to social cognition by innate and acquired
knowledge (Adolphs, 1999). Any total conception of the nervous system has to treat man as
genetically endowed to function as a member of a group, with built-in drives and propensities to
behave as humans are known to behave. To omit a person's relations with other members of the
group is to leave out almost everything (Gregory, 1987).
Social cognition refers to the processes that subserve behaviour in response to conspecifics (other
individuals of the same species), and, in particular, to those higher cognitive processes subserving
the extremely diverse and flexible social behaviours which are seen in primates. Its evolution arose
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out of a complex and dynamic interplay between two opposing factors: on the one hand, groups can
provide better security from predators, better mate choice, and more reliable food; on the other
hand, mates and food are available also to competitors from within the group. An evolutionary
approach to social cognition therefore predicts mechanisms for cooperativity, altruism, and other
aspects of pro-social behaviour, as well as mechanisms for coercion, deception and manipulation of
conspecifics (Adolphs, 1999). The former are exemplified in the smallest groups, in the bond
between mother and infant; the latter in the largest groups by the creation of complex dominance
hierarchies. Also, in studying the behaviour of a driver, as a contributor to the safety and
effectiveness of a traffic system, the influences of these mechanisms will be apparent.
It is known that focal brain damage can result in impaired processing that is limited to highly
specific categories. For instance, patients have been reported who are specifically unable to
recognise, or to name, tools, animals, people, or a variety of other selective categories. There is
thus very strong evidence that categories are, in some sense, mapped in the brain. The categories
which are abstracted emerge naturally out of the covariances of people's interactions with certain
classes of stimuli in the environment. Thus, people typically interact with members of the class of
animals in a similar way; that is, the similarity is greater among animals than it is to how people
typically interact with members of the class of tools, or members of the class of people. Similarity
in sensorimotor interaction can thus translate into functional and anatomical similarity in the brain
(Solomon et al., 1999).
The above view suggests a strong component of experience and learning in such self-organised
topographic maps. A different explanation comes from the view that there are innately specified
modules in the brain for processing specific categories of knowledge. The evidence for this latter
view is strongest from domains such as language, and it is the view that has historically been
associated with the notion of 'modularity' (Fodor, 1983). As with many dichotomies, it is likely
that both views are right, in the proper context, and recent interpretations suggest a softer version of
'modularity' that does not require a rigid set of criteria (Coltheart, 1999). It may well be that there
are domain-specific modules for processing certain kinds of information which are ecologically
highly relevant and that would benefit from a particular, idiosyncratic processing strategy which
does not apply to other kinds of information. That is, one would expect the brain to provide
problem-specific structures for processing information from those domains in which there is a
premium on speed and survival. Within, and beyond, such a module there might also be
topographic mapping of the same domain. It is likely that domain-specific processing draws upon
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innately specified modules, as well as upon self-organised maps which emerged as a consequence
of experience with the world (Adolphs, 1999).
Some rather basic attributes of stimuli, such as self-directed motion, bilateral symmetry, and
presence of eyes might be processed similarly by different primate species, by mechanisms which
are highly innately specified. However, there also seems little doubt that the class of social stimuli
needs to be explored during development in order to be able to make more fine-grained distinctions
- a development process which is likely to include behaviour of the supervisor and pretend playas
critical aspects. The most plausible scenario, then, would view social cognition as relying on a
neural architecture in which there is interaction between components which are innately specified
and others whose operation emerges through experience in the context of a specific culture. For
example, some classes of emotions, such as guilt, shame, embarrassment, and jealousy only make
sense in a social context. Other social signals, and other types of social judgments, draw upon
systems which subserve emotional processing in general, systems which permit people to build
models of other individuals through simulation, and a vast network of structures which contribute to
reasoning, inference and language. In fact, most of the neural structures known to be important to
social cognition are also important to emotion, and to associating stimuli with reward and
punishment (Adolphs, 1999).
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3.8 Final Remarks
Very little has been done to determine what makes road users speed, drive while drunk, overtake, or
yield at crossroads. The risk of accident involvement may be one motivational factor that plays a
role, but there are clearly others which are equally important (Rothengatter, 1988b). If traffic
engineers and psychologists are to be successful in modifying driver behaviour through education,
publicity or enforcement activities, the identification of these underlying mechanisms is of primary
importance. Unless models of driver behaviour are developed which take account of these
mechanisms, modelling will not be able to accurately predict behaviour, and will offer very little
guidance for developing measures aimed at influencing the behaviour involved. Unlike the
researcher and the policy maker, road users have other things to worry about than accident statistics.
In reality, the pluralistic motivations of different drivers and the dominance of satisficing behaviour
characterise the driving scene.
Furthermore, traffic engineering and psychology carves driver behaviour up into functional pieces,
such as risk perception, sensation seeking, and road rage. For example, the word 'risk perception'
does not refer to something that an average driver, and for that matter his/her brain, does. These
functional pieces are useful for organising information into general areas of research but do not
refer to real functions. Not even a researcher interested in quantifying traffic risks has a system in
his/her brain dedicated to risk perception. Psychological research has been extremely valuable and
there is no denying of the validity and utility of observed driver behaviour documented in literature.
However, an approach where driver behaviour is studied in terms of brain functioning is far more
powerful and can help to choose between alternative psychological hypotheses. The proper level
of analysis of a psychological function is the level at which that function is represented in the brain.
Unless neurobiological plausibility is attended to, the functionalism that driver behaviour can be
understood independent of knowledge of how the brain works, will needlessly waste precious time
and effort on bitter controversies in future, as is evident from the protracted debate on risk
homeostasis. To fuel these arguments, add careless and biased reading, and misinterpretations
particularly from incomplete quotations.
From investigations of complex phenomena, such as learning and remembering tasks involving
several of the senses, stem the view that the brain acts as a whole (Gregory, 1987). It is apparent
that the driving task draws on a considerable number of human capabilities and functions, such as
perception (vision, hearing, and touch), attention, memory (encoding and retrieval of procedural and
declarative memory), motor control, language, and emotions. Furthermore, expert neural systems,
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specialised towards performing the mentioned functions, are all interdependent and interacting on
various levels while impacting to a greater or lesser degree on the observed behaviours during the
course of a drive, as studied by traffic psychologists, such as sensation seeking, speed choice, and
passing manoeuvres. Therefore, it is important to realise that research on driver behaviour really
necessitates studying the central nervous system as a whole. Implementation of a piece-meal set of
models of different psychological paradigms seems to do disservice to the efficiency and
remarkable unity of the brain in normal action (Taylor, 1999). It is also important that mental
disorders (such as road rage and disregard for traffic laws), like mental order, reflect the workings
of the brain (LeDoux, 1998). Understanding and modelling the complex world of the driver and
driver error in an effective manner are thus no walk in the park - making it even more important to
model on the solid and sound knowledge basis of brain functioning, a raison d'être of neuroscience.
As an example of interacting specialised networks consider the case of visual perception. In one
simple view humans see by processing perceptual qualities such as form, colour and motion using
independent modules. The organisation of the brain into processing streams (DeYoe and Van
Essen, 1988) supports the idea that brain processing is specialised, but it does not imply that these
streams contain independent modules. Independent modules should be able to fully compute their
particular processes on their own. However, much perceptual data argue against the existence of
independent modules, because strong interactions are known to occur between perceptual qualities
(Egusa, 1983; Faubert and Von Grunau, 1995; Kanizsa, 1974; Pessoa et al., 1996; Smallman and
McKee, 1995). For example, changes in perceived form or colour can cause changes in perceived
motion, and vice versa; and changes in perceived brightness can cause changes in perceived depth,
and vice versa (Grossberg, 2000).
In addition to the discussed advantages from explaining human (driver) behaviour in terms of brain
activity, light could be shed on important side issues, such as the existence of extra-sensory
perception (ESP). ESP refers to any 'mental faculty' which allows a person to acquire information
about the world without the use of the known senses. Such 'faculties' are generally classified as (i)
telepathy, (ii) clairvoyance, and (iii) precognition. A fourth phenomenon, psychokinesis, while not
involving perception in the recognised meaning of the word, is almost always studied alongside
ESP. Is there evidence that ESP exists? The non-materialistic view of the universe claims that it
does. Despite the fact that it is scientifically unfashionable, it nevertheless commands wide
support, even today, among the population at large. Given the limited understanding of the brain
and mind presently, it is possible to support this view without being in any way irrational or
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unscientific, though most scientists would probably lean towards a more agnostic position (Gregory,
1987).
Establishing the reality of one or all of these faculties would be of great interest to anyone engaged
in studying the brain and nervous system. Not only would strictly mechanistic models of
psychology, such as those exemplified by Skinnerian behaviourism, have to be scrapped, but many
of the assumptions and theories of physical science would need at least to be thoroughly
overhauled. Clearly, if ESP exists, the idea of a non-materialistic component to the universe, with
its own peculiar make-up, becomes more plausible. If the mind can roam more or less at will, then
it would seem that man is, in part at any rate, a non-physical being, capable of exercising far greater
control of his own destiny and of his environment than is usually assumed by science (Gregory,
1987).
Researchers are only just beginning to understand the workings of the brain, and attempts to explain
man's innermost workings on the basis of physics, chemistry, and electricity make humans seem
like extensions of the materialistic world. Few people want to have their 'souls stolen' from them
so that they are no longer thought of living, caring, and vulnerable beings for whom beauty, art,
music, and culture are more important than all things scientific. People even like it better when
they think that they live in a universe full of mystery, with room for endless discoveries as well as
endless delights (Dolphin, 1988). Biases like these, emergent from human brain activity, playa
role when conducting driver behaviour studies since humans have to effectively study their own
(frequently irrational) behaviour. According to Dolphin, scientists each bring their religious and
philosophical presuppositions with them when they work in the lab - it is simply not possible to
have science in a vacuum.
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CHAPTER4
A NEXT STEP: AN EXPERIMENT AL PLATFORM FOR FUTURE
DRIVER BEHAVIOUR RESEARCH BASED ON THE INTEGRATION
OF ENGINEERING AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC KNOW-How
4.1 Overview
State-of-the-art technologies within transportation engineering offer advanced capabilities for data
and parameter measurement and extraction from driver behaviour experiments. A rich set of data
can currently be obtained in such experiments performed in a simulator or instrumented vehicle,
such as video and audio capturing, as well as spatial and temporal characteristics of objects forming
part of the driving environment, especially those for the driver. Notwithstanding the diverse
variety of data types available from driver behaviour experiments, data mining is essentially based
on the underlying behaviouristic models presently applied in transportation engineering. This is in
stark contrast to what has been an ongoing revolution in the understanding of how the human brain,
given streams of input from a structured world by its sensory receptors, can perform functions and
learn novel facts in a humanlike manner by means of a system which computes with simple neuron-
like elements, acting in parallel. Thus, the neuroscientific approach, as set out in the previous
chapter, is the reverse.
At the moment, the principal source of information on the global brain in action involves the
discipline of functional brain imaging. Together with descriptions of the functions performed by
the various brain areas, observed active while human subjects solve various tasks, these
experimental paradigms are currently spearheading an attack on the modus operandi of the brain in
toto. Thus, in order to align research on driver behaviour so that contemporary neuroscience can
bear on the knowledge and understanding of such behaviour, a necessary step would be to
incorporate brain-imaging devices into the sensor suite of driver behaviour experiments.
Accompanying the implementation of brain imaging, an imperative further step, needed to be taken
by driver behaviour modellers, would be to develop neural network simulations which give overall
agreement in activations with that observed in brain-imaging experiments. These mentioned steps
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will contribute towards bringing driver behaviour research on par with the level of advanced
knowledge on human behaviour offered in modern neuroscience, and introduce the well-
instrumented and closely-monitored experimental platform offered by driver behaviour research
into mainstream neuroscientific experimentation.
To illustrate the advances achievable in better understanding and modelling driver behaviour
through integration of neuroscientific principles and know-how into driver behaviour
experimentation, consider the issue of driver aggression and road rage from the field of
transportation engineering. It is rather unfortunate that the focus of the aggressive driving issue has
been almost exclusively on who are the aggressive drivers and what aggressive behaviours they
display, rather than on why drivers in general are more aggressive now than before, and what can be
done (not necessarily to the drivers) to ameliorate the situation. Research on aggressive driving to-
date demonstrates that a significant amount of aggressive driving can probably be reduced by a
careful, user-friendly, and ergonomically oriented design of the driving environment. Also, from
an effective public health perspective the way to reduce road aggression should be to control the
situations that give rise to it, rather than focus exclusively on driver education and mass media
campaigns'. However, before these results can be applied, they should be validated extensively.
Apart from difficulties with present measures of aggression, much more data are needed on the
relationship between environmental stimuli, individual differences and aggressive driving, before
action oriented large-scale programs can be justified.
From research results, overt behaviours, such as affective (horn honking, vocalisations, and
gesturing) and instrumental (acceleration) responses, currently employed in experiments, bring
about concerns of reliability when employed as indicators for signalling driver frustration and
aggression. In addition, consistent with knowledge from neuroscience, physiological responses do
not correlate reliably with overt aggressive behaviours. Thus, despite efforts to provide a robust
definition of aggressive driving, there remains a need for a more operational, useful, and commonly
agreed-upon definition of aggressive driving. Taken together, the failure to observe the expected
reliable relationships amongst aggression, overt behaviours, and visceral arousal raises questions
about the soundness of the present experimentation paradigm.
In order to revitalise and advance not only research and the subsequent knowledge-base on driver
aggression, but also on all other driver-related issues, the author proposes a shift towards the
integrated experimental paradigm. Such an endeavour calls for close collaboration between
specialists from a number of mentioned fields in the short term, as knowledge from a diverse set of
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fields will be called upon in such a process of integration. The proposed experimental paradigm
for future research on driver aggression can be further illuminated from the perspective of
neuroscience, based on what is known about brain imaging, neural models, depression, and fear.
From literature, activity in response to emotional stimuli in a region of the brain called the
amygdala, tracked by imaging techniques down to millisecond accuracy, is proposed to hold the key
in solving the pressing question, relating to which environmental stimuli serve to instigate
aggression. The availability of non-contact video cameras to tract driver's eye movements allows
researchers to examine a driver's visual search patterns, extract which part of the driving scene is
projected onto the driver's retinas, and correlate these environmental stimuli to brain activation
patterns from imaging results (in real-time). Together with subsequent neural network simulations,
the understanding brain mechanisms underlying processing of emotional information will be
important to understand the phenomenology of aggression. It will also have implications for
treatment of aggression and road rage, providing a mechanism behind which the action of therapies
can be explained. More information from literature with respect to the set-up and implementation
of such an experiment is given in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
In terms of the notion of a model, any kind of scientific statement, concept, law, or any description
of a phenomenon is a model which tries to reflect a phenomenon of the external world (Cilliers,
2001). Thus, in short, the activation of the amygdala in the face of emotional stimuli in the traffic
environment can be seen as a phenomenological model, hypothesised from the basis of extensive
medical results referred to in this chapter and Appendix B. Furthermore, in terms of «future neural
network (connectionist) model of aggression, the appropriate neural network to simulate observed
stimuli-memory-behaviour relationships (from brain imaging) is both based on the cytoarchitectonic
and modular characteristics known to be functionally involved. Temporally accurate imaging
explicitly confirms the modular structure and the exchange of information amongst the various parts
of the brain. It is not just the amount of detail (at both levels: cellular and network) which
determines the observed effects, but also which details. This is in line with the claim for the need
of specialised knowledge from neuroscience for models of both neuron functioning and the
intra/inter-connection of neurons amongst different brain areas, in order to build a required neural
network.
In contrast, the use of just any neural network (like ART, or multi-layer feed-forward networks, or
Kohonen maps), selected solely on the grounds of a sensitivity analysis of how well it simulates the
stimuli-memory-behaviour relationships, exhibits the same kind of doomed behaviouristic tendency
as previous psychological or AI modelling attempts in traffic engineering. Such an effort will
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typically come from a traffic engineer who disregards vital and available knowledge about brain-
behaviour relationships from another field; already applied in other human factors' fields for a
considerable time. And so, in terms of a better understanding, nothing is gained.
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4.2 State-of-the-Art Technologies for Experimentation
4.2.1 Traffic engineering
Given the diverse circumstances leading to motor vehicle crashes and the associated problem areas
and issues, effective collision avoidance countermeasures can best be realised through
comprehensive knowledge and understanding of both the events leading to crashes and the
contributing driver, vehicle, roadway, and environmental factors. Likewise, with increasingly
complex technologies being incorporated into vehicles, such as navigation systems, driver
information systems, and wireless communications, there has been an associated increase in the
demands placed on the driver and, as a consequence, a potential for increased risk of a crash. In an
effort to enhance the capability to study wide-ranging problems and issues associated with the
design and implementation of both crash avoidance systems and in-vehicle systems of convenience,
a variety of analytical and hardware-based tools have been developed (Barickman and Goodman,
1999). These tools allow the assessment of driver performance and behaviour under a variety of
circumstances and conditions in settings that either approximate the real world or are in fact the real
world.
An associated problem that has become increasingly apparent in the development of models of
driver behaviour over the last few years is the absence of reliable data with which simulated
processes, such as car following, may be compared (Brackstone et aI., 1999). Obtaining such data,
and the associated increase in model validity that this would allow, is clearly becoming of greater
importance since a reliable baseline is required against which improvements in traffic flow and
safety produced by many advanced transport telematics systems can be judged. Variations in
behaviour between drivers and differences in acceleration and deceleration performance of vehicles
result in perturbations in traffic flow, which in turn increase accident risk and reduce capacity.
Measurement of such behaviour can help in the understanding of the processes involved and the
identification of remedial measures, for instance, driver training or advanced transport telematics,
and a database of such knowledge could be used for direct analysis or as input to a microscopic
simulation model.
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Figure 4.1 Example of a laboratory-based driving simulator
In the past, behavioural databases have almost all been collected at discrete spatial and temporal
points and on a macroscopic level, for example, speed-headway distributions and relationships
extracted from measurements from overbridges (Brackstone et al., 1999). Several novel
approaches have also been devised in an attempt to collect information on dynamic, continuous
relationships affecting the driving process, for example, collecting data from a bank of video
cameras situated along the roadside (Brackstone and McDonald, 1995) or from a helicopter.
However, these in tum have met with severe practical problems, such as camera vibration,
pixelisation measurement error, driver awareness, and, not least, the logistical difficulties in setting
up such surveillance methods and analysing the data.
The alternative to on-road data collection is the use of laboratory-based simulators in which the
driver is placed in a fully controlled virtual environment where his/her reactions to external stimuli
can be accurately measured in a systematic manner over as long a period as desired (see Figure 4.1).
However, the main drawback is the uncertainty about whether the measured driver responses reflect
those that would occur in the real world. Regardless of its complexity, the simulator will always be
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unable to present the rich sensory patterns that occur in real driving, and if an error should be made,
it will have little direct consequence on the driver. Nevertheless, such simulators have a significant
role to play in research, particularly in the assessment of the effects of alcohol and drugs on driver
performance and other factors that would be unsafe to test in a real vehicle surrounded by traffic
(Linfield and Dunne, 1988).
Another alternative method of gaining information on behaviour, however, is the use of an
instrumented vehicle, which is driven in the traffic stream as a platform from which to observe the
behaviour of a test driver or adjacent drivers. This approach is realistic, accurate and relatively
inexpensive (compared with simulators) and may be the only method that can produce a sufficient
quality and quantity of data to allow the continued development and validation of simulation
models (Brackstone and McDonald, 1996).
Significant advances in computational and sensor technology have resulted in capabilities that for
the first time allow the evaluation of drivers and systems under truly naturalistic, in situ driving
conditions (Barickman and Goodman, 1999). The need for such a capability is obvious given the
frequent criticism of research in which the circumstances of data collection are questionable on the
basis of realism and the highly controlled settings that are frequently used in such research.
Furthermore, the need for field and operational testing of new in-vehicle technologies from the
standpoint of effectiveness and safety often demands as realistic a setting as possible. With these
requirements in mind, the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), for
example, has developed a family of vehicle instrumentation systems which allow a wide range of
on-the-road testing and evaluation of both conventional technologies (for example, mirror systems)
and advanced technologies (for example, rear-end crash avoidance systems, and navigation
systems). These systems are portable in that they can be installed in virtually any vehicle. This
feature provides desirable versatility and allows research to be carried out on a variety of test beds
with a minimal investment in instrumentation. Other equally important features of these systems
include the inconspicuous and unobtrusive installation of instrumentation and sensors, use of off-
the-shelf technology, long-term data collection potential, extensive upgrade flexibility, and
relatively low cost.
Naturalistic data are viewed as falling into three categories:
a) Baseline data: Data that would represent the distribution of performance and behaviour of
interest, characteristic of a given population of drivers.
57
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
b) Focused data: Data that would be directed at evaluating a specific aspect, system, or device
from the standpoint of its influence on driver behaviour and performance.
c) Near-miss and incident data: Data that would focus on the occurrence of near misses and
incidents that occur during driving, including antecedent events.
In each of these areas, data collection is associated with its own characteristic set of requirements
and constraints for an acquisition system. In the case of baseline data, a system should be capable
of long-term acquisition of sampled acquisition under a given set of constraints (for example, speed
> lOOkm/h, turn-signal activation). For focused data collection, the activation or use of the
technology of interest (for example, cellular telephone, automatic braking system) as well as
antecedent conditions would be required, whereas for near-miss and incident data collection,
appropriate triggering criteria (for example, rapid steering rate, hard braking) would be necessary
along with antecedent information. The availability of these capabilities provides an invaluable
tool for addressing a host of vital design and safety issues associated with both conventional and
advanced technologies, and provides an excellent mechanism for validating laboratory-based
simulators. It should be noted that because of the very nature of naturalistic data collection and the
use of drivers' own vehicles operated under normal, realistic, driving conditions, there is an
opportunity to also study more visible contemporary issues, such as intoxicated drivers and
aggressive drivers in settings that would otherwise not be possible.
Sensor suite
A vehicle instrumentation system can be composed of a diverse variety of sensors in order to allow
collection of a variety of parameters and their derivative measures. The system is generally
installed in a subject's vehicle with the following list of basic core parameters:
a) Global positioning system (GPS) -latitude, longitude, speed, heading angle
b) Throttle position
c) Lateral lane position
d) Headway distance
e) Vehicle speed
f) Brake application
g) Lateral acceleration
h) Longitudinal acceleration
i) Vertical acceleration
j) Yaw rate
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k) Hand wheel angle
I) Tum-signal activation.
Other parameters and associated measures can be modified or added as needed to meet specific
testing requirements. Some examples that have been previously implemented include (Barickman
and Goodman, 1999):
a) Brake pedal force
b) Brake line pressure
c) Head position measurement
d) Variety of headway sensors (for example, radar and infrared (IR) based)
e) Audio channels.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, work on dynamic data collection was extended to allow the
collection of a greater range of pre-dominantly driver-based variables, such as heart rate, electro-
dermal response, and electro-myographic measures of muscle tension in order to obtain a
physiological measure of driver response to situational stimuli (Helander, 1975).
Another area of interest is in examining the driver's visual search pattern by using records of the
driver's eye movements (see Figure 4.2). Until recently, the best way to undertake such an analysis
was to use an 'eye mark' camera mounted on a helmet worn by the driver, though because of their
bulk these were generally only applied in simulator experiments. Recent developments have now
resulted in the availability of non-contact (dashboard-mounted) units, mainly in use by vehicle
manufacturers (Brackstone et al., 1999).
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Figure 4.2 Application of eye tracking systems: (a) Head mounted interface, (b) Remote interface
(for example, dashboard mounted), (c) Sample image of a subject's field-of-view captured by a
head-mounted video camera. The computed gaze position (white circle) is overlaid on the
environment image and visualised in real-time (SensoMotoric Instruments)
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Data Pre- and Post-triggering
On most occasions, the onset and evolution of an event are not the only or primary data of interest.
Therefore, instrumentation systems have the capability to pre-trigger data collection or, in other
words, record antecedent data which define the conditions and actions preceding the event itself.
Systems are also capable of post-triggering, which enables the system to collect data for some
specified amount of time after an event has occurred. For example, an experimenter could define
the triggering point of a data collection event as a warning level from a collision avoidance sensor.
When the warning is activated, the preceding say 30 s of data leading up to the event would be
stored to a file along with the event data and, if desired, data for say a 45 s period following the
event. This approach to data collection allows for more efficient data reduction since it eliminates
the need to sort through large quantities of data collected. It is also ideal for collecting near-miss
and incident data as well as more focused technology-oriented data (for example, activation of a cell
phone). Systems can also be configured to collect data defining multiple events using the pre- and
post-triggering scheme. These configurations can easily be modified to allow experimenters to
look at a variety of questions while only collecting data for a single experimental series (Barickman
and Goodman, 1999).
Conclusions
A vehicle instrumentation system is an economical and versatile tool to support the data collection
needs for research in a wide variety of transportation fields. Such a system is unique in that it can
actually be installed into a subject's personal vehicle, be inconspicuous to other drivers, and be
unobtrusive to the driver. System features, such as extended video data collection, event
triggering, and the system's ability to pre-trigger data collection, allow researchers the flexibility to
collect operational field data over long time periods without intervention. The ability to collect
truly naturalistic data over extended periods oftime is viewed as an important capability for
supporting both human factors and vehicle engineering research covering conventional
technologies, advanced technologies, as well as high-visibility driver behaviour, such as
aggressiveness and intoxication.
4.2.2 Neuroscience
Neuroscience has undergone explosive growth. New brain-imaging technologies have allowed
researchers to address questions which were in the realm of aimless speculation two decades ago.
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The manner in which the brain computes in various tasks is being probed at a deep level by these
brain-imaging techniques, with an increasing appreciation of the different networks being used to
solve these tasks. There is simultaneously developing a neural modelling technology, which
attempts to explain the underlying computations being performed by this set of networks. Further,
better computers have contributed to improved, more detailed models of neural function. It is
becoming increasingly possible to link perception, attention, memory, and other aspects of
cognition to neurobiology - which allows the fruits of modern neuroscience to bear on the nature of
higher mental function. The study of cognition has moved firmly into the domain of biological
science (Squire and Kosslyn, 1998).
For example, recent efforts to integrate psychometric and neurobiological data about personality
have stimulated diverse interdisciplinary applications. The dissociation of major brain systems
linked to procedural and propositional memory and learning has clarified the clinical distinction
between two components of personality: temperament and character. For example, temperament
can be defined in terms of individual differences in percept-based habits and skills (related to
procedural memory and learning), which are regulated by the amygdala, hypothalamus, striatum,
and other parts of the limbic system. In contrast, character can be defined in terms of individual
differences in concept-based goals and values (related to propositional memory and learning),
which are encoded by the hippocampal formation and neocortex. Recent descriptive,
developmental, genetic, and neurobehavioural studies indicate that at least four dimensions of
temperament (harm-avoidance, novelty-seeking, reward-dependence, and persistence) and three
dimensions of character (self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence) can be
uniquely described and functionally dissociated (Cloninger, 1994).
Brain-imaging technologies
Perception, action, cognition and emotion can now be mapped in the brain by a growing family of
techniques. Positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
event-related electrical potentials (ERP), event-related magnetic fields (ERF) and other non-
invasive imaging techniques are rapidly evolving and providing an increasingly rich literature on
the functional organisation of the human brain. Spatially, temporally, physiologically and
cognitively accurate computational models of the neural systems of human behaviour are the
ultimate objective of functional brain mapping.
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PET and fMRI machines investigate the underlying neural activity in the brain indirectly, the first
by measuring the two photons emitted in the positron annihilation process occurring during the
radioactive decay of a suitable radio-nuclide, such as H2 150 injected into a subject at the start of an
experiment; the second from the uneven distribution of nuclear spins (effectively that of the proton)
when a subject is in a strong magnetic field (usually of 1.5 T, although a 12 T machine is being built
especially for human brain imaging studies) (Taylor, 1999). The PET measurement allows
determination of regions of largest blood flow, corresponding to the largest 2-photon count. The
fMRI measurement is termed that of blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD). This signal stems
from the observation that during changes in neuronal activity there are local changes in the amount
of oxygen in tissue, which alters the amount of oxygen carried by haemoglobin, thereby disturbing
the local polarisibility. In this system, a giant magnet surrounds the subject's head (Figure 4.3).
Changes in the direction of the magnetic field induce hydrogen atoms in the brain to emit radio
signals. Much excitement surrounds the newer technique of fMRI in that no radioactive materials
are needed and produces images at a higher resolution than PET. Since the method is non-
invasive, researchers can do hundreds of scans on the same person and obtain very detailed
information about a particular brain's activity, as well as its structure.
Figure 4.3 A normal volunteer prepares for an fMRI study of face recognition. She will have to
match one of the faces at the bottom of the display with the face at the top. The researcher adjusts
the mirror which will allow her to see the display from inside the magnet. The volunteer's brain is
particularly active in an area of her right hemisphere called the fusiform gyrus (arrow) as she
matches the faces. This 'slice' of her brain is seen as through looking through her face (National
Institute of Mental Health, Maryland)
The sensitivity of the two types of machines is not comparable. Spatially they have a few
millimetres accuracy across the whole brain. However, temporally they are far less effective. PET
63
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
measurements need to be summed over about 60-80 s, limiting the temporal accuracy considerably,
while fMR! is far more sensitive to time, with differences in the time of activation of various
regions being measurable down to a second by the' single event' measurement approach. This has
already produced the discovery of startling dissociations in the time domain between posterior and
anterior cortical sites in working memory tasks (Ungerleider et aI., 1998).
Many cognitive studies have been performed using PET; there are now as many using fMRI, some
duplicating the PET measurements. These results show very clear localisation of function and the
involvement of networks of cortical and subcortical sites in normal functioning of the brain during
the solution of tasks. At the same time there has been considerable improvement in the
understanding of brain activity in various mental diseases, such as schizophrenia, Alzheimer's and
Parkinson's diseases. There have also been studies of patients with brain damage, to discover how
the perturbed brain can still solve tasks, albeit slowly and inefficiently in many cases (Taylor,
1999).
The magnetic field around the head, due to neural activity, although very low, is measurable by
sensitive devices, such as superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs). Starting from
single coils to measure the magnetic field at a very coarse level, magnetoencephalography (MEG)
measurements are now being made with sophisticated whole-head devices using 148 or even 250
measuring coils. Such systems lead to ever greater spatial sensitivity, although they have a decided
number of problems before they can be fully exploited. In particular, it is first necessary to solve
the inverse problem, that of uncovering the underlying current sources producing the magnetic
field. This is non-trivial, and has caused MEG not to be so far advanced in brain imaging as PET
and fMR! systems.
However, the situation is now changing. There is good reason to bring MEG up to the same
standard of data read-out simplicity as PET and fMRI as, although it does not have the same spatial
sensitivity as the other two, it has far better temporal sensitivity - down to a millisecond. Messages
from the senses travel so swiftly through the brain that PET and fMR! cannot keep up. Thus, MEG
fills in the temporal gap on the knowledge gained by PET and fMR!. This is also done with
electroencephalography (EEG) (Figure 4.4), which is being consistently used by a number of
groups in partnership with PET and fMRI so as to determine the detailed time course of activation
of known sites already implicated in a task by other devices (Taylor, 1999).
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Figure 4.4 In this version ofEEG, the positions of 124 recording electrodes (attached to a soft
helmet) are carefully plotted on an MRl model of the head (EEG Systems Laboratory, California)
Figure 4.5 Each of the colour-coded areas in this combined MRI/MEG image ofthe brain responds
to the touch of a different finger of the right hand (Llinás, NAS)
This next generation of imaging technology, based on simultaneous measurements of fMRI in
various combinations with MEG and EEG, will help researchers examine how various parts of the
brain exchange information. One of the first experiments in which fMRI was used jointly with
MEG produced a three-dimensional map of the areas of the brain that are activated by touching the
five fingers of one hand. A New York University research team headed by Llinás found this map
to be distorted in the brain of a patient who had two webbed fingers since birth. A few weeks after
the man's fingers were separated by surgery, however, parts of his brain reorganised and the map
became almost normal (Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.6 The images are based on data from 124 recording electrodes positioned in a soft helmet
that covered the woman's head. The scientists used an MRI -derived model of her head to correct
for any distortions in electrical transmission that might be caused by variations in the thickness of
her skull. The resulting images clearly show that various areas of the woman's brain are activated
in tum. However, these images are limited to the brain's surface (EEG Systems Laboratory,
California)
Cc)
In another example, depicted in Figure 4.6, the rapidly shifting patterns of activity in the images
reflect what goes on in the brain of a woman who is looking at a letter on a screen during a test at
the EEG Systems Laboratory, California. The woman's task is to decide whether the letter is
located in the same place as a letter she has seen before. In the 'low load' test she compares the
new letter's location to a previous one. In the 'high load' test she compares the new location to
three previous ones. The brighter colours reflect a higher degree of brain activation. A strong
electrical signal sweeps across the frontal cortex of her right hemisphere 320 milliseconds after a
new letter has appeared on the screen, as she compares the letter's location to three locations that
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she has seen before (Figure 4.6(a)). The same areas of her brain are activated, but less intensively,
in the second image, as she compares a new letter's location to only one location that she has seen
before. Only 140 milliseconds later (Figure 4.6(b )), a different set of electrical signals is recorded
from the volunteer's brain, as recreated in these images. This time the frontal cortex of her left
hemisphere is activated as she enters the location of the new letter into her working memory. After
the screen goes blank (Figure 4.6(c)), the volunteer rehearses the new memory. This activity
produces yet another electrical signal over her right hemisphere. The signals are more intense in
the high-load (left) than in the low-load (right) condition.
Output states
Based on the understanding of the functioning of the brain systems for vision, the concept of output
states in the brain can be put in perspective. Vision is the most extensively studied of the senses,
and, in humans, the most valuable. A much simplified schematic diagram of the visual pathway is
shown in Figure 4.7.
Retina LGN PGN Cortex
Figure 4.7 Schematic of visual pathways from retina to visual cortex (Harth, 1997)
Visual information gathered by the retina is first conveyed to neurons in the lateral geniculate
nucleus (LGN), a structure in the thalamus. From there about a million neural fibres go to a region
in the cortex called VI, the first cortical area devoted to vision. A prominent feature - but one
rarely discussed by physiologists - is the fact that perhaps 10 times as many fibres descend from VI
and send information back to the LGN. From VI the visual information travels along several
parallel pathways to centres called V2, V3, V4, and many others. Some 30 different visual centres
have been identified in monkey cerebral cortex. Again, practically all connections between
different cortical centres are reciprocal.
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The ubiquity of such loops of connectivity in the central nervous system blurs the distinction
between higher and lower cortical centres. There is no strict hierarchy of sensory processing. The
'higher' centres receive information from the 'lower' centres, but these sources are modified,
augmented, and censored by the 'higher' centres. The prominence of these return pathways,
especially the massive fibre bundle from VI to LGN, has been one of the great puzzles of cerebral
architecture. The cortex is clearly more bent on introspection and confabulation than on forming
an unbiased view of the outside world. Mental processes are therefore appropriately called
reflective, and concomitant neural activity is cyclic, self-referent. What distinguishes the thinking
brain from computers, and from most artificial neural networks, is the fact that in thought processes
there are no final, or output states (Harth, 1997).
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4.3 Setup and Application of an Integrated Experimental Platform
4.3.1 Integration - a next step
The problem of how the mind relates to the brain stands as one of the greatest challenges today.
The materialistic worldview and pragmatic approach to social problems are both being transformed
by discoveries of how human experience and culture arise in cerebral activity. Even so, this
process, spearheaded by neuroscience, has seen the important and contentious issue of driver
behaviour somehow been left behind. From the author's extensive literature study, to explore the
multi-faceted research on drivers' behaviour, it can be concluded that gross disregard of the neural
underpinnings of such behaviour tied to a behaviouristic approach is endemic to the field. In
general, a stalemate exists with numerous disputed qualitative psychological models (Michon,
1989).
Psychological research has been extremely valuable, but an approach where cognition and emotion
are studied as brain functions is far more powerful. Additionally, studying the way cognition and
emotion work in the brain can help to choose between alternative psychological hypotheses -
amongst all possible solutions to the question of how cognitions and emotions might work, the only
relevant one (in understanding human behaviour) is the solution which was put into the brain with
creation (LeDoux, 1998). Being a human driver incorporates a broad complement of interrelated
brain systems to perform driving tasks (psychological functions) at hand, such as lane keeping,
speed choice, risk perception, and obstacle avoidance. The proper level of analysis of such a
psychological function is the level at which that function is represented in the brain.
However, there are still those researchers maintaining that neurophysiological plausibility is
irrelevant to psychological theorising, and that the gap between knowledge of what brain structure
is and how it produces behaviour is so wide that any endeavour to make psychological theories
neuronally plausible is at best unhelpful, and at worst positively misleading. These views, together
with the fond hopes of opportunistic minimalists (like 'strong AI') (Dennett, 200 I) have been
dashed - they had hoped they could leave out various detail, like functional neuroanatomy and
neurochemistry, and they have learned that no, if one leaves out x, or y, or z, one cannot explain
how the mind actually works. To understand what humans actually do while exposed to various
traffic environments as opposed to what humans are capable of doing, it is of utmost importance to
let the fruits of modern neuroscience bear on the nature of driver behaviour models.
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Integration process
As discussed in a previous section, state-of-the-art technologies within transportation engineering
offer advanced capabilities for data and parameter measurement and extraction from driver
behaviour experiments. A rich set of data can currently be obtained in such experiments performed
in a simulator or instrumented vehicle, such as video and audio capturing, as well as spatial and
temporal characteristics of objects forming part of the driving environment, especially those for the
driver. Notwithstanding the diverse variety of data types available from driver behaviour
experiments, data mining is essentially based on the underlying behaviouristic models presently
applied in transportation engineering. The aim of a traditional model, such as a psychological or
AI model, is to describe the performance of the subject, not the way that the performance is
achieved. This puts such models in stark contrast to what has been an ongoing revolution in the
understanding of how the human brain, given streams of input from a structured world by its
sensory receptors, can perform functions and learn novel facts in a humanlike manner by means of a
system which computes with simple neuron-like elements, acting in parallel. Thus, the
neuroscientific approach is the reverse. In general, it starts with a model which incorporates brain-
like processing and sees whether behaviour emerges, which mimics that shown by people.
At the moment, the principal source of information on the global brain in action involves the
discipline of functional brain imaging. Together with descriptions of the functions performed by
the various brain areas, observed active while human subjects solve various tasks, these
experimental paradigms are currently spearheading an attack on the modus operandi of the brain in
toto (Taylor, 1999). Thus, in order to align research on driver behaviour so that contemporary
neuroscience can bear on the knowledge and understanding of such behaviour, a necessary step
would be to incorporate brain-imaging devices into the sensor suite of driver behaviour
experiments. Accompanying the implementation of brain imaging, an imperative further step,
needed to be taken by driver behaviour modelIers, would be to develop neural network simulations
which give overall agreement in activations with that observed in brain-imaging experiments.
These mentioned steps will contribute towards bringing driver behaviour research on par with the
level of advanced knowledge on human behaviour offered in modern neuroscience, and introduce
the well-instrumented and closely-monitored experimental platform offered by driver behaviour
research into mainstream neuroscientific experimentation.
To illustrate the advances achievable in better understanding and modelling driver behaviour
through integration of neuroscientific principles and know-how into driver behaviour
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experimentation, consider the collection of driver-based variables, such as heart rate and electro-
dermal response in order to obtain a physiological measure of driver response to situational stimuli.
Not only can neuroscience provide an explanation of how the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and
hormonal responses (leading to changes in heart rate and sweating) are brought about (see
Appendix B for a detailed discussion), but it can also shed light on the rather low utility of
monitoring such driver-based variables in isolation. These visceral responses have relatively slow
actions, too slow to be the factor determining which emotion the driver experiences at a given
moment (LeDoux, 1998). A far more robust methodology currently available for linking up driver
response to specific situational stimuli, would incorporate brain imaging and neuroscientific know-
how of the specific brain networks been activated sequentially (down to milliseconds) to produce
the mentioned visceral responses.
It is also important to note that in preparing driver behaviour experimentation in order to
incorporate principles and knowledge from neuroscience, the sensor suite for the collection of
driver-based data should be capable, inter alia, to capture the environmental stimuli impinging on
the human senses. Everything humans know about their world comes to them through their senses
of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Although scientists recognise that there are several
additional kinds of sensations, such as pain, pressure, temperature, joint position, muscle sense, and
movement, these are generally included under 'touch'. (The brain areas involved are called the
somatosensory areas.) An example of capturing such a stream of input on a sensory receptor
involves driver sight or vision. As mentioned in a previous section, recent developments have
resulted in the availability of non-contact (dash-board-mounted) video cameras to tract driver's eye
movements. These records allow researchers to examine the driver's visual search patterns and to
extract which part of the driving scene is projected onto the driver's retinas (in real-time).
Final remarks
To further driver behaviour modelling through the implementation of the envisaged integrated
platform for experimentation, collaboration is needed among investigators from the fields of
neuroscience, psychology, mathematics, computer science, and engineering. In this process, the
use of modem brain-imaging techniques will be invaluable in establishing and applying knowledge
in terms of the neural correlates of particular driving subtasks and different driver behaviours.
Providing a neurally-inspired computational model of general human behaviour is a challenge for
decades to come. Driver behaviour research is an integral element in achieving this quest.
Consequently, driver error will be understood better, driver education enhanced, and computer-
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aided telekinesis for driving realised. Above and beyond, the experimental platform within the
driving environment provides proving grounds for models of general human behaviour. However,
in doing so, the extent of structural impacts on the brain of each individual, brought about by a
lifetime of interaction with the environment, may not be overlooked or disregarded.
4.3.2 Towards the better unders tanding of an important issue in transportation engineering:
aggressive driving
Aggressive driving can be defined in terms of the frustration-aggression model, originally proposed
by Dollard et al. (1939). In this context aggressive driving is a syndrome of frustration-driven
behaviours, enabled by the driver's environment filled with experiences of stress, anxiety, anger,
antagonism, and fear (James, 1997). These behaviours can either take the form of instrumental
aggression - that allows the frustrated driver to move ahead at the cost of infringing on other road
users' rights (for example, by weaving and running red lights) - or hostile aggression which is
directed at the object of frustration (for example, cursing other drivers). Interestingly, Dollard et al.
chose to illustrate the frustration-aggression model with the behaviour of a hypothetical college
student who is stopped and berated by a police officer (the frustration source) in front of his
girlfriend. Once he drove away, the student "grated the gears frequently in shifting, refused to let
other cars pass him, and made insulting comments about every policeman who came in sight".
This link of aggression to frustration is very important, since it implies that a frustrating situation,
behaviour, or event instigates all aggressive behaviours (Shinar, 1998).
While these behaviours may be reflective of individual differences in aggression, it can be argued
that the exclusive focus on the characteristics of the aggressive drivers and how to control them is
short-sighted. Instead, Shinar (1998) proposes an ergonomic-oriented approach that involve
environmental modifications. For greater highway safety, the greatest benefit of embracing the
frustration-aggression model is that it provides a systems approach to the problem. As such it can
be used to show that aggressive driving can be reduced not only by changing driver behaviour
directly (for example, through enforcement) but also through changes in the environment that
breeds aggression. Furthermore, efforts that focus exclusively on restraining driver instrumental
aggression through enforcement may actually contribute to road (or off-road) rage and displaced
aggression. This viewpoint of aggressive behaviour does not negate the existence of individual
differences in aggression, but it does highlight the contribution of the environment (in frustrating
the drivers' goals) to aggressive behaviour. The role of personality and predisposing tendencies
that a driver brings with him/her to the driving environment is illustrated by Retting and Williams'
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(1996) finding that red light violators are three times as likely to have previous multiple violations
in comparison to non-violators.
Shinar (1998) proposes that over the past few decades drivers have not changed their personality
and have not become more aggressive people. Instead, the conditions that elicit aggressive
behaviours - especially on the road - have changed, so that the level of frustration is above the
'aggression threshold' for more and more drivers. As an example, consider the role of congestion
as a common source of frustration and aggression. In light of this, it is rather unfortunate that the
focus of the aggressive driving issue has been almost exclusively on who are the aggressive drivers
and what aggressive behaviours they display, rather than on why drivers in general are more
aggressive now than before, and what can be done (not necessarily to the drivers) to ameliorate the
situation. Given this approach, in order to reduce or eliminate aggressive driving by treating its
causes rather than its carriers (especially when driver surveys suggest that aggressive driving
characterises the majority of the driving population), researchers need to first identify the sources of
the frustration.
Evaluation of existing measures of aggression
From research results it appears that overt behaviours, such as affective (horn honking,
vocalisations, and gesturing) and instrumental (acceleration) responses, currently employed in
experiments, bring about a number of difficulties as reliable indicators for signalling driver
frustration and aggression. For example, consider gender differences in aggression and violent
behaviour, which have been studied ad-nausea. In a meta-analysis of 143 studies, which examined
gender differences in aggressive behaviour, Hyde (1984) found that while none of the studies
showed that women were more aggressive than men, and many studies showed that men are more
aggressive, the gender differences explained only 5% of the variance, once other individual
characteristics were taken into account. However, the discrepancy between this result and the
over-involvement of males in violent crimes is due to the fact that in most psychological studies, the
aggressive behaviour being measured does not take into account that women are less likely to
exhibit extreme aggression, but, although possibly just as likely to be frustrated, they exhibit
aggression in more subtle terms (Shinar, 1998). In driving, aggressive behaviours span a wide
range from muttering, through yelling and making obscene gestures, and all the way to violent
actions with the car. Furthermore, the hom honk response, used predominantly because the
latency, duration, and frequency of a honk can be easily measured and readily elicited as a form of
aggression, is also questionable as a measure of aggression (McGarva and Steiner, 2000).
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In addition, consistent with knowledge from neuroscience (discussed in a previous section),
physiological responses do not correlate reliably with overt aggressive behaviours. Although one
expects that drivers who respond more aggressively to provocation (another factor apart from
frustration that elicit aggression) will also exhibit heightened physiological responses, McGarva and
Steiner (2000) did not observe changes in heart rate and blood pressure to vary as a function of
driver aggression. Taken together, the failure to observe the expected reliable relationships
amongst aggression, overt behaviours, and visceral arousal raises questions about the soundness of
the present experimentation paradigm. Thus, despite efforts to provide a robust definition of
aggressive driving, Shinar (1998) believes that there remains a need for a more operational, useful,
and commonly agreed-upon definition of aggressive driving. Overt behaviours and physiological
responses are just not specific enough.
What present results do show are the strong associations between the environmental conditions
under which drivers operate and the level of manifest aggression. The ergonomic approach to
problem solving assumes that (a) in a system in which many users behave 'inappropriately', the
fault is more likely to be with the system design than with the individual users, and (b) it is more
efficient (and more user-friendly) to change bad design than to force people to adapt to it. In his
testimony to Congress, Martinez (1997), the NHTSA administrator also noted several examples of
how changes in traffic travel patterns reduced traffic violations and crashes. However, some of the
mediating factors cannot be that easily manipulated to reduce stress, such as time of day, and
geographically and culturally based norms. Other factors - such as congestion producing factors -
are costly to affect. Nonetheless, it is critical to consider these factors if aggressive driving is to be
reduced (Shinar, 1998).
To summarise, research on aggressive driving to-date demonstrates that a significant amount of
aggressive driving can probably be reduced by a careful, user-friendly, and ergonomically oriented
design of the driving environment. Also, from an effective public health perspective the way to
reduce road aggression should be to control the situations that give rise to it, rather than focus
exclusively on driver education and mass media campaigns. However, before these results can be
applied, they should be validated extensively. Apart from difficulties with present measures of
aggression, much more data are needed on the relationship between environmental stimuli,
individual differences and aggressive driving, before action oriented large-scale programs can be
justified (Shinar, 1998).
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Incorporating neuroscientific know-how
In order to revitalise and advance not only research and the subsequent knowledge-base on driver
aggression, but also on all other driver-related issues, the author proposes a shift towards the
integrated experimental paradigm, as discussed previously. Such an endeavour calls for close
collaboration between specialists from a number of mentioned fields in the short term, as
knowledge from a diverse set of fields will be called upon in such a process of integration. This is
a premium for worthwhile insights and progress to stem from such a research program. However,
the proposed experimental paradigm for future research on driver aggression can be further
illuminated from the perspective of neuroscience, based on what is known about brain imaging,
depression, and the emotion of fear.
Consider the fact that previous psychological research suggests that depressed individuals engage in
prolonged elaborative processing of emotional information (Siegle et al., 2002). Armed with a
computational neural network model of emotional information processing and event-related fMRI,
Siegle et al. found that activity in response to emotional stimuli in a region of the brain called the
amygdala was sustained in depressed individuals, even following subsequent distracting stimuli.
Since the amygdala is known to be involved in processing emotion, that is not altogether startling.
The difference in sustained amygdala activity to negative and positive words was only moderately
related to self-reported rumination (through questionnaires).
Amygdala activity was also inversely related to activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
which is consistent with the idea that depression could involve, in part, decreased inhibition of the
amygdala by cortex. This study has a number of potentially important clinical implications.
Depressed individuals are frequently observed to have difficulty in life situations not considered to
be inherently emotional. Results suggest that a depressed person's experience of an emotional
stimulus could persist well beyond that stimulus, and in fact, could persist into the time they are
expected to be engaging in other activities, leading to interference with these subsequent activities.
Observations also suggest that understanding brain mechanisms underlying sustained processing of
emotional information may be important to understand the phenomenology of depression. It can
also have implications for treatment of depression, providing a mechanism behind which the action
oftherapies can be explained. For example, re-engaging inhibition from DLPFC through Wells'
(2000) attentional control training can decrease sustained amygdalar activity.
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A great deal of evidence suggests that emotional information is processed in parallel by brain
systems responsible for identifying emotional aspects of information (the amygdala system) and
other brain areas primarily responsible for identifying non-emotional aspects of information (the
hippocampal system) (LeDoux, 1998). These systems are highly interconnected and subject to
feedback. Ingredients of an emotional feeling needed to turn an emotional reaction into a
conscious emotional experience, like depression, fear, or aggression, can be summarised as:
a) A specialised emotion system which receives sensory inputs and produces behavioural,
autonomic and hormonal responses.
b) Cortical sensory buffers which hold on to information about the currently present stimuli.
c) A working memory executive (prefrontal cortex) which keeps track of short-term buffers,
retrieves information from long-term memory and interprets the contents of the short-term
buffers in terms of activated long-term memories.
d) Cortical arousal keeping conscious attention directed towards the emotional situation.
Bodily feedback - somatic and visceral information which returns to the brain during an act of
emotional responding.
The fear system is understood as well or better than other emotional systems (LeDoux, 1998) (the
author wants to explicitly refer readers to Appendix B.4 for a detailed discussion of the amygdala
and emotional behaviour). The fear system is not, strictly speaking, a system that results in the
experience of fear. It is a system which detects danger and produces responses which maximise the
probability of surviving a dangerous situation in the most beneficial way. In other words, it is a
system of defensive behaviour. Interactions between the defence system and consciousness
underlie feelings of fear, but the function of the defence system is survival in the face of danger.
The discovery of a pathway which could transmit information directly to the amygdala from the
thalamus suggested how a conditioned fear stimulus could elicit fear responses without the aid of
the cortex. The direct thalamic input to the amygdala simply allows the cortex to be bypassed.
The fact that emotional learning can be mediated by pathways which bypass the neocortex is
intriguing, for it suggests that emotional responses can occur without the involvement of the higher
processing systems of the brain, systems believed to be involved in thinking, reasoning and
consciousness.
Neurons in the area of the thalamus which projects to the primary auditory (and visual) cortex are
narrowly tuned - they are very particular about what they will respond to. However, cells in the
thalamic areas which project to the amygdala respond to a much wider range of stimuli and are said
to be broadly tuned. Although the thalamic system cannot make fine distinctions, it has an
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important advantage over the cortical input pathway to the amygdala in terms of time (Figure 4.8).
In a rat, the thalamic pathway is twice as fast. However, because the direct pathway bypasses the
cortex, it is unable to benefit from cortical processing. As a result, it can only provide the
amygdala with a crude representation of the stimulus. It is thus a quick and dirty processing
pathway. The direct pathway allows a person to begin to respond to potentially dangerous stimuli
before he/she fully knows what the stimulus is. This can be very useful in dangerous situations.
However, its utility requires that the cortical pathway be able to override the direct pathway. It is
possible that the direct pathway is responsible for the control of emotional responses unbeknownst
to a person. This may occur in all humans some of the time, but may be a predominant mode of
functioning in individuals with certain emotional disorders.
-...._____
SE~EX ')
high road---
EMOTIONAL
STIMULUS
EMOTIONAl
RESPONSES
Figure 4.8 The low and high roads to the amygdala (LeDoux, 1998)
The responsibility of the cortex is to prevent the inappropriate response rather than to produce the
appropriate one. For example, consider driving along a highway and seeing a number of thin
parallel lines running across the surface of the road. The cortex would be needed to distinguish a
speed trap from among many other possibilities. However, responding immediately through
braking could save the driver a speed fine.
The amygdala is like the hub of a wheel. It receives low-level inputs from sensory-specific regions
of the thalamus, higher level information from sensory-specific cortex and still higher level (sensory
independent) information about the general situation from the hippocampal formation. Through
such connections, the amygdala is able to process the emotional significance of individual stimuli as
well as complex situations. The amygdala is, in essence, involved in the appraisal of emotional
meaning and where stimuli do their triggering.
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To summarise, it is not unreasonable to suggest that by knowing what the different inputs to the
amygdala are, and having some idea of what function those areas play in cognition, one can get
some reasonable hypotheses about what kinds of cognitive representations can arouse certain
emotional responses. By the same token, if it is known how the brain achieves some cognitive
function, and it can be determined how the brain regions involved in that function are connected
with the amygdala, one can explain in a plausible way how such emotions might be aroused by that
kind of cognition. Thus, by knowing which cortical areas project to the amygdala, and knowing
the functions in which those areas participate, one can make predictions about how those functions
might contribute to emotional responses. Anatomy can, in other words, illuminate psychology,
thereby enhancing the understanding of human behaviour.
4.3.3 Summary
State-of-the-art technologies within transportation engineering offer advanced capabilities for data
and parameter measurement and extraction from driver behaviour experiments. A rich set of data
can currently be obtained in such experiments performed in a simulator or instrumented vehicle,
such as video and audio capturing, as well as spatial and temporal characteristics of objects forming
part of the driving environment, especially those for the driver. In terms of neuroscience, the
principal source of information on the global brain in action involves the discipline of functional
brain imaging. Together with descriptions of the functions performed by the various brain areas,
observed active while human subjects solve various tasks, these experimental paradigms are
currently spearheading an attack on the functioning of the whole brain.
To further driver behaviour research, so that contemporary neuroscience can bear on the knowledge
and understanding of such behaviour, a necessary step would be to incorporate brain-imaging
devices into the sensor suite of driver behaviour experiments. To complement this add-on, the
sensor suite for the collection of driver-based data should also be capable of capturing the
environmental stimuli impinging on the human senses, such as vision, hearing, and touch.
Accompanying the implementation of brain imaging, an imperative further step, needed to be taken
by driver behaviour modelIers, would be to develop neural network simulations which give overall
agreement in activations with that observed in brain-imaging experiments. Extensive
neuroscientific research has linked the sequences of activation of different brain areas for a host of
various tasks, which enable scientists to understand and impact on driver behaviour in terms of the
underlying neural processes.
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The implementation of the envisaged integrated platform for experimentation calls for collaboration
among investigators from the fields of neuroscience, psychology, mathematics, computer science,
and engineering. Providing a neurally-inspired computational model of general human behaviour
is a challenge for decades to come. Driver behaviour research is an integral element in achieving
this quest. Consequently, driver error will be understood better, driver education enhanced, and
computer-aided telekinesis for driving realised. Above and beyond, the well-instrumented and
closely-monitored experimental platform within the driving environment provides proving grounds
for models of general human behaviour.
To conclude, the proposed experimental paradigm for future research on driver aggression, as
depicted in Figure 4.9, is based on a multi-disciplinary effort, and on what is known about brain
imaging, neural models, depression, and fear. From literature, activity in response to emotional
stimuli in a region of the brain called the amygdala, tracked by imaging techniques down to
millisecond accuracy, is proposed to hold the key to understand better which environmental stimuli
serve to instigate aggression. The availability of non-contact video cameras to tract driver's eye
movements (in traffic simulators or instrumented vehicles) allows researchers to examine a driver's
visual search patterns, extract which part of the driving scene is projected onto the driver's retinas,
and correlate these environmental stimuli to brain activation patterns from imaging results (in real-
time). Together with subsequent neural network simulations, the understanding brain mechanisms
underlying processing of emotional information will be important to understand the phenomenology
of aggression and road rage.
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUDING REMARKS - FINDINGS AND PROPOSITIONS
5.1 Summary of Research Work
The objectives of the research reported in this dissertation have been fulfilled:
a) From an extensive literature study on the state-of-the-art of driver behaviour modelling, the
effect of behaviourism on the current stalemate and lack of new ideas in the field is
apparent.
b) The power of rooting observed driver behaviour on neuroscientific knowledge, to
understand better how such behaviour arises from the neural underpinnings of human brain
functioning, has been demonstrated, supported by case studies from literature.
c) Ways and means have been proposed to combine knowledge from neuroscience,
psychology, computer science, and engineering to lay the platform from which to study and
model driver behaviour holistically in future. Specifically, the author has put forward an
experimental paradigm for future research on driver aggression based on a multi-
disciplinary effort, and on what is known about brain imaging and activation, neural models,
depression, and fear.
To summarise, future transportation systems will integrate many sophisticated technologies,
including, for example, congestion prediction, dynamic routing, incident detection algorithms, and
automated emergency response generation. Systems of this complexity may lead to a large number
of diverse and complex interactions between the different components of the system. Computer
simulations which link the traffic control logic with a lane level traffic model which accurately
represents the movements of vehicles through the network can provide an understanding of these
interactions and motivate possible improvements to the design of the system. The feedback or
interaction between the control system and the traffic flow system is a key issue of an evaluation.
This requires that the simulation incorporate models for driver response. Only microscopic
simulation models provide the required level of detail and only a model which provides the
capability of modelling the dynamic interaction between the traffic management system and the
traffic flow on the network is appropriate for evaluation of these systems.
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Although efficiency and quality of mobility are important interests, especially for future intelligent
technologies, safety remains the predominant preoccupation of traffic engineering. It should be
evident that while current and future technologies have the potential to improve traffic safety, they
also have the potential to adversely affect it. Ultimately, the effect on safety depends on the
specific technologies that are invoked and the manner in which they are incorporated within the
vehicle as well as within the larger road transportation system. Current automotive developments
can be characterised as technology-centred solutions rather than user-centred solutions. Greater
effort must be directed at understanding and accommodating the human element in the road
transportation system in order that transportation objectives can be achieved. There is a need to
expand the scope of traditional human factors to understand human interactions with other elements
of the transportation system. Designers need models of the human information-processing system
that will predict driver decision-making, situational awareness and strategies for negotiating in
traffic. Such models, supported by much greater computing power, will revolutionise traffic
analysis.
Transportation lies between a social system and a physical system - it goes beyond physics to a
human scale. On the physical side are the striking variety and number of vehicles and road
systems, each contributing its own peculiarities, as well as the weather and other environmental
factors. The social, behavioural side encompasses not only the individual preferences and second-
by-second reactions of drivers but also actions taken by the rest of society. To understand the
forces acting on traffic flow, transportation planners have to analyse the many possible outcomes
from this complex network of decisions.
It seems that there has been a trend in the past to consider physics as reality and the psychological
response as a deviation from that reality. However, independent and dependent variables are
actually being mixed up, a mistake that is only now being exposed. Thus, deriving equations from
physical descriptions of motion and subsequently trying to fit these to data derived from
behavioural responses, both literally and figuratively, puts the cart before the horse. It is a
historical result of the fact that most traffic modellers are trained in physics and grounded in
engineering. As a result, such models have proved largely disappointing. Modellers also frame
the question of behaviour around the idea of optimal performance. The reality is that the pluralistic
motivations of different drivers and the dominance of satisficing behaviour in driving mean that
such models are unlikely to render the 'grail' of a simple formula. Differing contextual factors
from the driving environment add layers of complexity to modelling as such factors are introduced.
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These efforts can rapidly devolve to curve-fitting exercises in which additional degrees of freedom
are added to formulations, as more contextual elements are included. What such models eventually
represent, in driving terms, only their advocates can explain. Generally, there is no spark of
intelligence and no learning; there is only data-driven information processing. If the outcome of a
programme run will be at all surprising, it is simply because of the complexity of the computation.
A related problem in driver behaviour modelling revolves around the fact that rules which describe
externally observable behaviour and rules which determine the functional relations which generate
such behaviour tend to be confused or combined indiscriminately. Using a rule which describes
observable behaviour as a shorthand expression for internal information processing brings with it
the risk of infesting the model with pernicious homunculi or vicious circles - technically speaking
one is putting the explanandum in the explanans. Artificial Intelligence models, such as rule-based
systems, may seem to conform to the principle of making a clear distinction between these two
types of rules. However, ruled-based models, such as Soar, are built on the assumption of rational
reasoning and learning from rules of logic, which, among numerous other objections, is not
supported by literature as being characteristic of human behaviour, especially not emotionally-laden
decisions. On the other hand, psychological (motivational) models, such as the Theory of Risk
Homeostasis and Fuller's risk avoidance model, have been criticised for being qualitative in nature,
applicable only to single-instance situations, and lacking specificity regarding their internal
mechanisms, which precludes validation.
Although these models may, for example, be employed as the robot controllers of the computer-
driven vehicles on the displayed driving scenery of a traffic simulator experiment, traffic engineers
and psychologists are really in need of quantitative models of human behaviour to explain what
humans actually do while exposed to various traffic environments, as opposed to what humans are
capable of doing.
Little has been done to determine what makes road users speed, drive while drunk, overtake, or
yield at crossroads. While the risk of accident involvement may represent a motivational factor,
there are clearly others which play equally important roles. If traffic researchers are to be
successful in modifying driver behaviour through education, publicity or enforcement activities, the
identification of the underlying mechanisms is of primary importance. Unless models of driver
behaviour are developed which take account of these mechanisms, modelling will not be able to
accurately predict behaviour, and will offer very little guidance for developing measures aimed at
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influencing the behaviour involved. Unlike the researcher and the policy maker, road users have
other things to worry about than accident statistics.
Furthermore, traffic engineering and psychology carves driver behaviour up into functional pieces,
such as risk perception, sensation seeking, and road rage - just as psychology carves the mind up
into pieces, such as perception, memory, and emotion. These functional pieces are useful for
organising information into general areas of research but do not refer to real functions.
Psychological research has been extremely valuable and there is no denying of the validity and
utility of observed driver behaviour documented in literature. However, an approach where driver
behaviour is studied in terms of brain functioning is far more powerful and can help to choose
between alternative psychological hypotheses. The proper level of analysis of a psychological
function is the level at which that function is represented in the brain. Unless neurobiological
plausibility is attended to, the functionalism that driver behaviour can be understood independent of
knowledge of how the brain works, will cost the field dearly.
The driving task draws on a considerable number of human capabilities and functions, such as
perception (vision, hearing, and touch), attention, memory (encoding and retrieval of procedural and
declarative memory), motor control, language, and emotions. Furthermore, expert neural systems,
specialised towards performing the mentioned functions, are all interdependent and interacting on
various levels while impacting to a greater or lesser degree on the observed behaviours during the
course of a drive, such as obstacle avoidance, speed choice, and passing manoeuvres. Therefore, it
is important to realise that research on driver behaviour really necessitates studying the central
nervous system as a whole. Implementation of a piece-meal set of models of different
psychological paradigms seems to do disservice to the efficiency and remarkable unity of the brain
in normal action. Furthermore, mental disorders (such as road rage and disregard for traffic laws),
like mental order, reflect the workings of the brain.
Hebb put forward the case for basing models of brain functions on what is known about the
physiology of the brain, enabling the anatomist, physiologist and neurologist to contribute to
psychological theory. Hebb thought that it would help psychological theorising if there is an input
from neurophysiology. Regrettably, some researchers maintain that neurophysiological plausibility
is irrelevant to psychological theorising and that the gap between knowledge of what brain structure
is and how it produces behaviour is too wide. However, others, reacting to the functionalism that
the mind can be modelled independent of knowledge of how the brain works, have argued that
nature is more ingenious than humans are. Humanity stands to miss all that power and ingenuity
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unless neurobiological plausibility is attended to. The point is, it has already been done in nature,
so why not learn how the human brain actually works?
Fortunately, in the last decade or so there has been an ongoing revolution in the understanding of
how the human brain, given streams of input from a structured world by its sensory receptors, can
perform functions and learn novel facts in a humanlike manner by means of a system which
computes with simple neuron-like elements, acting in parallel. The investigation of what can be
achieved by models which perform parallel distributed processing is called connectionism. Since
the central principles of connectionist models are derived from current knowledge of computation
within the brain, the models are said to be 'neurally inspired'. This puts them in stark contrast to
traditional models in psychology or Artificial Intelligence. Traditional models in psychology
contain box-and-arrow elements like limited capacity channels, articulatory loops and short-term
memory stores. Models in AI contain sets of rules. In general, no attempt is made to relate the
operations these elements perform to the way the brain works at a neuronal level. The aim of a
traditional model is to describe the performance of the subject, not the way that the performance is
achieved. The connectionist approach is the reverse. It starts with a model which incorporates
brain-like processing and sees whether behaviour emerges, which mimics that shown by people.
Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks to this approach. For example, researchers do not have a
complete understanding of the way that information is transmitted between neurons in the brain.
The method of passing information from neuron to neuron in connectionist models certainly occurs,
at least at a conceptual level. However, in the brain there are other methods of inter-neuronal
signalling which are not yet implemented in connectionist models. But, the important point is that
completely accurate neural models will be possible in the future.
An appealing aspect of the connectionist approach is that the models of cognitive processes are
computational. That is, they actually produce a response to a stimulus. The predictions that such
models make about reaction time or error rate or interference can be compared at a quantitative
level to the behaviour produced by subjects in experiments. The inability of many traditional
models in psychology to do more than make qualitative predictions about the effect of some
experimental variable on performance has often made it difficult to choose between them because
they make the same qualitative prediction. Connectionist models have given a precise match to
data obtained in experiments with human subjects. Connectionist simulations do not just mimic
results which are already known, but their predictions have suggested fruitful areas for
experimentalists to investigate. Therefore, to mimic human behaviour it would be advantageous to
base modelling on a system architecture relating operations such as stimulus processing, learning,
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memory retrieval, emotions, and motor control to the way the brain functions at neuronal level.
Thereby it can be ensured that the 'required' and 'appropriate' intelligence and learning
mechanisms are built into the model.
The brain is a continuously self-organising measuring device in the world, and of the world. Apart
from knowledge of the anatomy (wiring) of the brain, equally important issues in understanding
human behaviour (and therefore driver behaviour) are the shaping effects of experience and
practice, in association with learning mechanisms and the process of information storage, from birth
over the years to adulthood, studied in developmental biology and psychology. People differ in the
pattern of their mental abilities because their brains grow in different forms. Some of this diversity
of human minds, and their temperaments and aptitudes, will be pre-programmed in a great variety
of outcomes of gene expression in nerve tissue development, but the same processes are also
influenced by postnatal environments. Growing brains require cultivation by intimate
communication with older human brains. A human brain after many years of life can be compared
with a chess-board (of gigantic complexity) on which the layout of the pieces reflects the history
and identity of one particular game.
It is of vital importance to keep all aspects of brain activity in mind when one, for example, sets out
to understand and model the behaviour of a learner driver, or the changes in behaviour over the
lifetime of a driver. For example, just consider how long the neural circuitry of an individual's
brain will have been exposed to the shaping effects of the environment by the time he/she applies
for a learner permit at, for say, the age of sixteen. In a learning phase, a driver will (and a driver
model should) eventually progress from delayed avoidance responses to anticipatory avoidance
responses. Some learning may perhaps be assimilated as a (apparent) set of driving rules (based on
language capabilities) and some may come about explicitly through exposure to the actions of
others.
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5.2 Propositions
To conclude, based on the findings from the literature study reported in this dissertation, the author
put forward a platform from where the issue of driver behaviour could be approached by combining
the aspects related thereto from an engineering and psychological perspective with and based on
neuroscience (involving neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, developmental biology and psychology)
and a modelling strategy (for instance, connectionism) in order to yield quantitative driver models.
The issue of driver behaviour has shown that it is complex and it is very clear that it should be
approached in a holistic way, and therefore it is of utmost importance that a combined effort be
made from the mentioned fields. It is uncommon that professionals in each of the above-
mentioned fields have a real good understanding of the other fields affecting driver behaviour, and
therefore the author, not pretending to be an expert, argues that such a union, if actively pursued,
will be of significant value in transportation and all behavioural sciences. It should be clear that
opposition against vigorously incorporating advances in neuroscience will constantly hamper
valuable progress on a wide front in the behavioural sciences.
The wealth of to-date knowledge amassed in neuroscience lies ready to be tapped by researchers
interested in explaining human driver behaviour, initially just through a synthesising effort. Of
utmost importance to the success of such a research effort will be the extent to which collaboration
is sought and established by investigators across boundaries of the mentioned traditional fields of
research, willing to contribute to the development of a comprehensive (representational and
computational) model of the driver. In order to strengthen and foster the proposed extension of the
basis from which driver behaviour is modelled and understood, the field of traffic engineering is in
need of being realigned through institutional re-engineering and broadening of its curricula to
enable its investigators and students to participate in the proposed collaboration efforts.
In addition, the proposed extension of the knowledgebase of driver behaviour will impinge on the
type of data and data-collection methodology required for calibrating such models in future. For
example, the use of modern brain-imaging techniques will be invaluable in pinning down the neural
correlates of particular driving subtasks, bearing in mind the extent of structural impacts on the
brain of each individual driver, brought about by a lifetime of interaction with the environment. In
essence, an important question will be how to read and make use of what is stored on the neural
circuitry of a driver. As a concrete next step in applying neuroscientific knowledge in traffic
engineering, the author proposes that supplementary work be conducted by a multi-disciplinary
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team to finalise the design and roll-out of an experiment to study the nature of environmental
stimuli as instigators of aggression and road rage, based on the utility of brain imaging and
(amygdala) activation.
Case studies mentioned in the literature study on the subject of connectionism demonstrate how
modelling, based on the principles of computation in the brain, can mimic specific human
behaviours. Once collaboration between investigators from neuroscience, psychology, traffic
engineering, and computer science can be initiated, similar results in terms of driver behaviour will
be achievable. In accordance to a criterion set by Michon (1985), the approach, as set out in this
dissertation, is essentially at the individual level as far as its performance is concerned, but it is
general to the extent that it describes human competence. That is, when applied to driving it could
be stated as a general theory of driver behaviour, but when put to work it would generate an
individual driver's history, depending on its learning experiences.
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